npm detections from LPM Firewall.

Direct source inspection confirms unconsented install-time harvesting and exfiltration of project files and host metadata to a third-party Discord webhook. This is concrete credential/dat...

Direct source inspection confirms unconsented postinstall modification of broad consumer AI-agent control surfaces. This meets the firewall block boundary even without separate credential...

The package contains an automatic preinstall hook that executes remotely hosted content through `mshta`. This is concrete malicious behavior, not merely a suspicious primitive.

This is concrete import-time credential/environment and filesystem reconnaissance followed by unconsented external exfiltration. The absence of lifecycle hooks limits installation impact...

The preinstall hook performs stealthy, unconsented execution of opaque native binaries rather than package setup. This is a concrete malware delivery chain, not a user-invoked CLI capabil...

Direct source inspection confirms automatic collection of environment and host data followed by transmission to a third-party Discord webhook. The absence of npm lifecycle hooks does not...

This is concrete, automatic data collection and exfiltration from the package entrypoint, not a package-aligned Babel preset implementation. Absence of an install hook does not mitigate r...

Direct inspection confirms concrete malicious install-time remote command execution, persistence, credential configuration mutation, and output exfiltration via npm publishing.

The lifecycle code concretely performs automatic setup, and package source documents that setup modifies AI-agent CLIs and creates persistent daemon behavior. This meets the firewall bloc...

This is concrete, obfuscated preinstall-time reconnaissance and exfiltration with no apparent package functionality. The lifecycle hook executes automatically during installation.

This package concretely performs unconsented postinstall writes to multiple global AI-agent instruction surfaces, meeting the blocking policy. Package-aligned checksum verification reduce...

Source inspection confirms unconsented postinstall writes to multiple foreign/broad AI-agent control surfaces. Remote binary bootstrap increases impact, despite no direct credential theft...

Direct source inspection confirms lifecycle-triggered host fingerprint exfiltration to an unrelated external endpoint. This is concrete malicious data collection, not a scanner-only infer...

Source inspection confirms the scanner's core finding: the package performs automatic postinstall writes into the consumer project, including MCP configuration. The absence of an observed...

Direct inspection confirms a credential-harvesting lifecycle payload with external exfiltration and no legitimate package implementation. This is concrete malicious behavior, not a scanne...

This is a concrete unconsented postinstall mutation of foreign AI-agent control files, meeting the firewall block boundary. The user-invoked CLI capabilities do not mitigate the install-t...

Source inspection confirms a concrete postinstall control-surface mutation, not merely scanner similarity. Marker merging and limited CLAUDE safeguards do not remove the default unconsent...

The package has a concrete, automatic postinstall chain that modifies foreign project-level AI-agent control files and defaults to all targets. No exfiltration was found, but the control-...

Source inspection confirms an unconsented install-time remote binary download and hidden execution. The utility exports are a cover for the lifecycle payload.

Direct source inspection confirms a concrete install-time remote executable download and hidden execution chain. The platform and environment guards reduce exposure but do not make the be...

Direct source inspection confirms a platform-gated postinstall chain that downloads and executes a remote executable invisibly. The benign exported utilities do not justify this behavior.