npm detections from LPM Firewall.

This is concrete install-time remote executable staging from an unauthenticated endpoint with no observed integrity verification. Although the behavior is package-aligned for a native CLI...

This package delegates its installed executable to unauthenticated install-time network content, creating a concrete remote code execution supply-chain risk even though the wrapper is CLI...

The malicious behavior is concrete and lifecycle-triggered: postinstall.js fetches unauthenticated remote content from 115.190.124.243 and executes it. The date utility files do not mitig...

The concrete issue is not classic malware but lifecycle-triggered mutation of Claude Code control files in the consuming project, which the policy treats as blockable AI-agent control hij...

Source inspection confirms an install lifecycle script that exfiltrates CI/build identifiers and hostname to an external callback, so this is not merely a scanner false positive. The limi...

Source inspection confirms an unconsented postinstall network beacon that transmits CI/project and host identifiers, matching a dependency-confusion canary rather than inert placeholder c...

Static inspection confirms automatic lifecycle mutation of Claude Code .claude agents/commands, which is a foreign/broad AI-agent control surface. Even though no exfiltration, remote code...

OpenSSF/OSV malware advisory MAL-2026-6788 blocks this version. The npm package `datefmt-helper` is a supply-chain dropper disguised as a benign date-formatting utility (its `description`...

Static source inspection confirms concrete import-time remote code execution with environment and host data staged in scope, hidden behind obfuscated endpoint strings. This is not package...

Direct source inspection confirms import-time remote code execution from an obscured external endpoint plus local environment and host data collection. This is not aligned with the packag...

Static inspection confirms an unconsented npm lifecycle write into ~/.claude/skills, a foreign/broad AI-agent control surface covered by the block policy. The planted content appears beni...

Static source inspection confirms unconsented lifecycle mutation of ~/.claude/skills, a broad/foreign AI-agent control surface covered by the block policy. The planted content appears saf...

Under the install-control-surface policy, unconsented lifecycle writes into ~/.claude/skills are blockable AI-agent control hijack even when the content appears product-aligned. Other net...

The package appears to be a real OpenCode/NIM booster, but its postinstall performs unconsented registration into OpenCode agent configs and project config. Under the install-control-surf...

Although the plugin functionality and Webshare endpoints are product-aligned, npm lifecycle execution unconditionally registers the package into OpenCode user/home configs and drops proje...

Static source inspection confirms unconsented lifecycle-time mutation of a broad OpenCode AI-agent control surface, which is blockable under the install-control-surface policy. The proxy...

Direct source inspection confirms import-time credential/environment harvesting and external exfiltration with no user consent or package-aligned purpose. This is concrete malicious behav...

OpenSSF/OSV malware advisory MAL-2026-6789 blocks this version. package.json declares a preinstall lifecycle script that runs `curl` to POST installer reconnaissance data — hostname, curr...

Direct source inspection confirms unconsented install-time network beaconing in a dependency-confusion package, even though it does not harvest credentials or execute shell commands. The...

Source inspection confirms a concrete remote-code-execution path in index.js, not merely scanner noise. Although there is no install hook, the exported API hides execution of server-suppl...

Source inspection confirms a lifecycle-triggered dependency-confusion PoC with external install pingback and persistent identifier, which is concrete unconsented behavior even though it d...