npm detections from LPM Firewall.

Static source inspection confirms an attacker-controlled remote payload loader and executor reachable at runtime. Lack of install hooks lowers automatic install-time impact, but does not...

Source inspection confirms concrete malicious behavior: hidden detached execution of remotely fetched code unrelated to a React/DOM package or normal logger middleware. Lack of install ho...

Static inspection found no install/import malware in the library bundle, but the shipped .claude local permission file is a concrete unconsented AI-agent control-surface risk that can exp...

Static source inspection confirms a hidden remote payload loader that executes server-supplied JavaScript with Node capabilities. Absence of install hooks only limits the trigger; it does...

Source inspection confirms an install-time obfuscated script that transmits the full environment, creating a concrete credential-exfiltration risk. The behavior is not package-aligned tel...

Source inspection confirms automatic install-time collection and outbound transmission of process.env, which can contain credentials and is not necessary for a dotenv-style package. The p...

Source inspection confirms concrete install-time AI-agent/MCP control-surface writes via package.json postinstall and bin/install.js mappings. There is no confirmed credential exfiltratio...

The payment functionality is plausibly package-aligned, but install-time mutation of AI-agent skill/control files is unconsented and durable. That concrete lifecycle behavior meets the fi...

Source inspection confirms install-time mutation of AI-agent control files, which is not necessary for a CLI library install and persists behavior outside the package. Package-aligned pay...

Direct source inspection shows concrete install-time credential/environment collection and obfuscated outbound telemetry behavior. Because it runs automatically during npm install and col...

Source inspection confirms concrete install-time writes to .cursor/.claude/.codex/.openclaw instruction surfaces and package.json, which matches the firewall's AI-agent control hijack blo...

Static inspection confirms an install-time write to user-level GoodVibes instruction locations containing mandatory agent directives. That constitutes unconsented lifecycle AI-agent contr...

Source inspection confirms concrete runtime exfiltration of process.env to an unrelated endpoint in both TypeScript source and published dist entrypoints. The lifecycle scripts are noisy...

The source confirms unconsented install-time mutation of AI-agent control files and a background self-update path that reruns that mutation. Even though the payment/network code largely m...

The confirmed postinstall behavior crosses the firewall boundary: it automatically writes package-supplied AI-agent instructions into user-global agent loader directories. That is concret...

Static source inspection confirms install-time writes into AI-agent control directories and project config; this matches the firewall's concrete malicious category for unconsented lifecyc...

Static source inspection confirms lifecycle-time creation of a package-supplied AGENTS.md in the consuming project. Under the firewall policy this is unconsented AI-agent control-surface...

Although the contents look like a legitimate opencode agent bundle and no exfiltration/destructive code was found, installing npm packages must not silently install or activate AI-agent c...

The confirmed issue is not generic network or credential handling; it is install-time mutation of Claude skills and MCP configuration, an AI-agent control surface. Under the firewall boun...

Source inspection confirms unconsented lifecycle writes to Claude Code skill directories, which is a concrete AI-agent control-surface mutation even though the content matches the package...

Source inspection confirms a postinstall hook that writes package-controlled Claude skill instructions into the user's AI agent configuration area without an explicit setup command. That...