npm detections from LPM Firewall.

Inspected source proves unconsented install-time mutation of a foreign, global AI-agent control surface. This meets the blocking policy even though the commands are Telora-related and no...

The automatic global-install chain activates foreign AI-client configuration without a consent step, meeting the blocking policy for install-time agent control-surface mutation. Package-a...

The user-wide fallback makes this an automatic mutation of a broad AI-agent control surface, rather than setup confined to package-owned extension state. This meets the supplied blocking...

The source establishes unconsented postinstall mutation of a broad AI-agent instruction surface, including a user-level fallback outside the installation scope. Package-specific markers a...

Source shows an unconsented postinstall write to a foreign, shared AI-agent control surface, including a user-wide fallback. This meets the blocking policy despite the package-aligned ins...

OpenSSF Malicious Packages via OSV confirms unified-platform@99.9.1 as malicious (MAL-2026-17566): Malicious code in unified-platform (npm)

OpenSSF Malicious Packages via OSV confirms risk-detection@99.9.1 as malicious (MAL-2026-17563): Malicious code in risk-detection (npm)

Source inspection establishes automatic transmission of personal Git information, beyond ordinary anonymous installation telemetry. A vendor-owned destination and opt-out flags do not est...

The source establishes unconsented postinstall mutation of a foreign, shared AI-agent control surface, which meets the blocking policy. Package-aligned instruction content and uninstall c...

Source confirms an unconsented postinstall write to a broad AI-agent instruction surface, which meets the blocking policy. The task-related content and directory guard do not remove that...

Inspected source proves automatic, unconsented postinstall writes to foreign agents’ global control configuration. This meets the explicit blocking rule regardless of the package’s safety...

Inspected source establishes unconsented postinstall writes to foreign agents' global control settings, which meets the blocking policy. Existing-policy preservation and package-aligned a...

The source establishes unconsented install-time mutation of a foreign, global AI-agent control surface, which meets the specified blocking rule. Ordinary instruction content and the absen...

Inspected source establishes automatic collection and external transmission of local metadata during installation and import. This concrete data exfiltration supports blocking despite the...

Inspected source establishes automatic collection and external transmission of local host and project metadata during installation and import. This concrete exfiltration behavior supports...

Inspected source establishes automatic collection and external transmission of local metadata during installation and import. This concrete data exfiltration supports blocking independent...

Source confirms automatic host and project metadata exfiltration during installation and import. This concrete behavior supports blocking independently of the scanner fingerprint.

Inspected source proves automatic local metadata exfiltration during installation and import, unrelated to functional internationalization behavior. The package's research claim does not...

Inspected source establishes automatic local metadata collection and transmission to an external endpoint during installation and import. This behavior supports blocking independently of...

Direct source inspection establishes automatic metadata exfiltration on installation and import. Package claims of an authorized test do not establish consumer consent or neutralize the a...

Inspected source establishes automatic host and project metadata exfiltration through both lifecycle and import entrypoints. The limited payload narrows the impact but does not neutralize...