npm security reports, with evidence.

The package's postinstall hook reaches code that silently writes instructions and configuration across multiple AI-agent control surfaces. This meets the blocking policy for unconsented i...

The automatic postinstall path writes behavior-bearing configuration into AI-agent control locations without consent. This is concrete install-time control-surface mutation and warrants b...

The postinstall automatically modifies user-level Claude settings to enable forwarding session content to an external collector. This is an unconsented install-time data exfiltration path...

The unconsented global npm postinstall mutates multiple AI agent control surfaces by installing a skill and registering an MCP server. This meets the policy for blocking an install-time a...

The automatic postinstall hook makes unconsented changes to two foreign AI-agent control surfaces by registering this package’s MCP server. This meets the blocking policy for install-time...

The postinstall hook activates an outbound beacon that transmits machine identity and project path metadata to an unrelated hard-coded endpoint. This is active, unsolicited data exfiltrat...

The package automatically transmits host and project location metadata to an unrelated external endpoint during installation and import. This is concrete data exfiltration, so the package...

The automatic lifecycle hook launches six unsolicited browser windows and detaches its process, creating disruptive behavior on installation. The README's self-description as a benign sca...

The automatic postinstall mutates user-level Codex and Claude agent skill directories and prunes their contents. This is an unconsented install-time change to AI-agent control surfaces, s...

The npm postinstall automatically mutates installed agent integrations and invokes native logic that repairs Codex hooks, establishing unconsented install-time control-surface changes. Th...

The registry script contains active command execution and external transmission of collected system information, behavior unrelated to the stated CSS polyfill purpose. This is concrete ma...

The source establishes automatic, unguarded writes to OpenCode's shared agent control surface, meeting the explicit blocking rule. Ordinary workflow content and the absence of exfiltratio...

The source establishes unconsented postinstall mutation of a foreign, global AI-agent control surface, meeting the explicit blocking rule. Ordinary development prompts and absent exfiltra...

Inspected source proves automatic, concealed execution of a bundled encoded PowerShell command through a self-deleting script. This concrete behavior supports blocking independently of sc...

Source establishes automatic export of existing third-party credentials to a package-controlled recipient, beyond ordinary authentication to their intended services. This concrete default...

The source establishes an automatic postinstall path that invokes configuration of foreign AI clients without consent, meeting the blocking agent control-surface policy. Package-aligned d...

Inspected source establishes unconsented postinstall mutation of a foreign user-level AI-agent control surface, which meets the supplied blocking policy. The verdict does not rely on scan...

Source establishes unconsented install-time mutation of a broad Claude control surface, which meets the blocking policy. The NextSpark dependency guard does not establish ownership of the...

Inspected source establishes automatic, unconsented postinstall mutation of shared AI-agent instructions and configuration, meeting the blocking policy. Environment skips and preservation...

The inspected lifecycle path performs unconsented global-install writes to foreign and shared AI-agent control surfaces, meeting the supplied blocking rule. The global-only gate, opt-out,...