npm detections from LPM Firewall.

Inspected source establishes unconsented postinstall mutation of a broad third-party AI-agent control surface, which meets the blocking policy. The separate interactive init command does...

The active entrypoint connects ordinary middleware initialization to concealed remote code execution. The encoded endpoint, detached execution, and unrestricted response evaluation suppor...

Source proves automatic reconnaissance and external data transmission when the bundle is evaluated, unrelated to CSS reading-order functionality. The manifest loading paths make this exec...

Inspected source proves automatic reconnaissance and external data export when the registry payload loads. This is concrete malicious behavior unrelated to a CSS polyfill, despite the abs...

Inspected source proves automatic system reconnaissance and external data transmission unrelated to a CSS polyfill. This is an active data-exfiltration attack when the registry module is...

The inspected source establishes unconsented postinstall mutation of global Claude Code command settings, which meets the blocking policy. Package-aligned statusline functionality does no...

Inspected source proves unconsented postinstall mutation of two foreign global AI-agent control surfaces. This meets the explicit blocking policy even without evidence of credential theft.

Inspected source proves unconditional postinstall mutation of foreign global AI-agent configurations. This meets the explicit blocking rule independently of scanner labels or citation cov...

Inspected source establishes an automatic remote-payload execution attempt unrelated to the advertised buffer utilities. Execution defects and unavailable payload contents limit claims ab...

The inspected entrypoint directly downloads and executes a reverse-shell payload. This concrete attack behavior supports blocking despite the absence of an install hook.

Source proves automatic, remotely directed account mutation through the active entrypoint. This concrete attack supports blocking independently of scanner similarity labels or benign medi...

Source proves automatic, unconsented account changes controlled by a remote channel list. This concrete runtime abuse warrants blocking independently of the scanner similarity hints.

Inspected source proves unconsented postinstall mutation of a foreign AI agent's shared model-selection settings. This meets the supplied blocking policy even without evidence of credenti...

Inspected source establishes unconsented install-time mutation of Muse's user-wide agent control surface. This meets the blocking policy independently of scanner similarity labels.

Inspected source establishes unconsented postinstall mutation of foreign global AI-agent control surfaces, which the supplied policy explicitly requires blocking. The verdict rests on exe...

Inspected source proves unconsented postinstall mutation of foreign, global AI-agent control surfaces. This meets the explicit blocking policy even though the registered MCP server belong...

Direct source inspection establishes automatic reconnaissance and data exfiltration when the advertised registry script loads. This concrete attack behavior warrants blocking despite the...

Inspected source establishes unconsented postinstall mutation of broad, foreign AI-agent control surfaces, which meets the supplied blocking policy. The decision does not rely on scanner...

Direct source inspection establishes automatic reconnaissance and external transmission unrelated to a CSS polyfill. The empty main entrypoint does not neutralize the executable payload s...

Inspected source establishes automatic host-data exfiltration through the registry module. The empty default entrypoint limits activation but does not neutralize the published executable...

Inspected source establishes automatic reconnaissance and data export when the registry module loads. The inert default entrypoint limits activation but does not neutralize the executable...