npm detections from LPM Firewall.

This is unconsented install-time collection and exfiltration of host and user identity data to an unrelated external IP address. The empty runtime module provides no legitimate package fu...

The import-time loader combines remote payload execution, detached process creation, and self-removal. These behaviors are concrete malicious execution, even though npm lifecycle hooks ar...

The automatic postinstall hook modifies both Codex and Claude user configuration surfaces and adds user-level dependencies. This is concrete install-hook abuse rather than an explicit use...

The source directly contradicts the postinstall dry-run claim: the invoked helper takes its full server-start and SSH path. The deliberate concealment and automatic lifecycle execution es...

The package has a conditional automatic install hook that rewrites foreign AI-agent authentication and sandbox controls. This creates a concrete agent-control compromise even though no da...

The source directly transmits BYOK credentials to a fixed non-provider endpoint. The absence of install hooks limits the trigger but does not remove the credential-exfiltration behavior.

The package has a concrete automatic lifecycle path that mutates consumer AI-agent control surfaces and configures execution of another package. This meets the install-control-surface blo...

The hardcoded external logging endpoint receives serialized account configuration during normal initialization, including fields capable of holding IMAP passwords. This is concrete data e...

The shipped runtime contains a complete automatic path from account loading to silent third-party transmission of account metadata. This is concrete unconsented data exfiltration, not req...

This is a concrete import-time remote code execution chain concealed in unrelated glob-matching code. The absence of an install hook does not mitigate execution when an application import...

The package contains concrete, automatic, remotely directed manipulation of an authenticated third-party account. Its benign Node version preinstall check does not mitigate that runtime b...

The automatic postinstall hook mutates a user-wide OpenCode tool control surface by installing agent-callable code. This is a concrete install-hook abuse despite the absence of network ex...

The only package source defines a preinstall reverse-shell-style command with remote HTTP posting. This is concrete malicious install-hook behavior.

This package performs automatic postinstall mutation of foreign AI-agent components and includes a path that weakens their sandbox and permission defaults. That meets the install-hook con...

The automatic postinstall chain mutates broad, foreign AI-agent control surfaces and launches persistent background indexing. This meets the install-hook abuse blocking policy even though...

The only executable package behavior is an automatic preinstall hook containing a remote interactive-shell construction and external HTTP posting. This is concrete install-time compromise...

The postinstall hook overwrites a global Pi agent instruction file rather than performing an explicit user-invoked setup. This meets the install-time AI-agent control-surface mutation blo...

The automatic postinstall path performs broad, unconsented mutation of foreign AI-agent control surfaces and installs persistent command hooks. This meets the install-hook abuse policy ev...

The automatic lifecycle hook installs a package-authored AI-agent control framework into and prunes the consumer project. Although the inspected path has no network or credential theft be...

The package has a concrete automatic install-time chain that writes broad AI-agent configuration and installs a command hook in the consumer project. This meets the install-hook-abuse blo...

The lifecycle hook creates and populates a consumer OpenCode configuration, including enabled npx-based MCP commands. That concrete automatic control-surface mutation meets the blocking p...