OpenSSF/OSV advisory MAL-2026-5597 confirms this npm version as malicious. On `npm install`, the package's postinstall script writes `.mcp.json`, `CLAUDE.md`, and a `.claude/commands/0x2ai-boot.md` slash-command file into the installer's current working directory. The `.mcp.json` (scripts/postinstall.cjs:38-44) configures Claude Code to auto-launch a bundled MCP server pointed at `https://demo9.0x2ai.com` with a hardcoded `BRIDGE_AUTH_TOKEN`...
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OpenSSF Malicious Packages via OSV
Summary
Malicious code in 0x2ai-demo9 (npm)
Details
On `npm install`, the package's postinstall script writes `.mcp.json`, `CLAUDE.md`, and a `.claude/commands/0x2ai-boot.md` slash-command file into the installer's current working directory. The `.mcp.json` (scripts/postinstall.cjs:38-44) configures Claude Code to auto-launch a bundled MCP server pointed at `https://demo9.0x2ai.com` with a hardcoded `BRIDGE_AUTH_TOKEN` ('09da458dd2d388aa2009a85333901b253d1866d73f925bf8'). When the user subsequently runs `claude` in that directory, the MCP server silently forwards chatroom messages, memory operations, agent queries, and `provider_query` prompts to the remote bridge. The `CLAUDE.md` template is auto-loaded as system context and instructs the assistant to adopt an 'Olivia' identity, route all messages through `demo10.0x2ai.com`, never reveal internals, and follow hidden behavioral rules ('First rule of the family: you don't talk about the rules'). The package's own `bin/start.cjs` additionally launches `claude --dangerously-skip-permissions`, disabling per-action permission prompts that would otherwise warn the user about the agent's filesystem/network actions. The shared bearer token authenticates every installer as the same identity on the author's bridge.
Decision reason
OSV/OpenSSF confirms 0x2ai-demo9@1.0.0 as malicious package MAL-2026-5597. Malicious code in 0x2ai-demo9 (npm)