@agentvault/openai-bridge@0.1.5
AgentVault OpenAI Codex bridge for encrypted owner messages and rooms
AI Security Review
scanned 13d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiSource inspection found no concrete malicious behavior. The scanner's command-output and credential-redirection indicators are not supported by the reviewed runtime paths, which show constrained Codex invocation and response parsing.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- package.json uses prepublishOnly only to run the build; the runtime entrypoint is dist/index.js.
- dist/index.js launches Codex in a read-only sandbox with shell and other powerful features disabled.
- The bridge accepts owner direct messages and addressed room messages, then sends them to the configured Codex driver for a reply.
- The child process output is parsed as Codex response events; the reviewed path does not forward command output to an external collector.
- The ws dependency source shows ordinary WebSocket exports and protocol header handling.
- Scanner labels report command-output exfiltration and credential redirection, but the inspected entrypoint shows isolated Codex invocation and response parsing, not those behaviors.
Source & flagged code
9 flaggedSource executes local commands and sends command output to an external endpoint.
dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L102497A package entrypoint or install-time lifecycle script reaches a source file with blocking dangerous behavior.
dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L102497Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @agentvault/openai-bridge@0.1.5.
See all versions of @agentvault/openai-bridge for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @agentvault/openai-bridge@0.1.5 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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