registry / @agentvault/openai-bridge
@agentvault/openai-bridge
AgentVault OpenAI Codex bridge for encrypted owner messages and rooms
This report shows the evidence for @agentvault/openai-bridge@0.1.17. 0 of 15 known versions are blocked or flagged. See all versions.
AI Security Review
scanned 37m ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe flagged process execution handles Codex turns, and the CLI routes bridge operation to the default AgentVault API or a validated HTTPS API origin. Startup is tied to explicit CLI use or service installation; the reviewed source does not establish unrelated credential or command-output exfiltration.
Static reason
High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.
Trigger
Explicit CLI use; the service starts for `run` or `replace`, and `install` configures a background service.
Impact
Expected bridge operation can send user-requested prompts and replies through the AgentVault service; no unrelated collection or attack behavior was found.
Mechanism
The bridge invokes the local Codex CLI, reads its turn output, and communicates through the configured AgentVault API. The default API is https://api.agentvault.chat.
AI rationale
The flagged process execution handles Codex turns, and the CLI routes bridge operation to the default AgentVault API or a validated HTTPS API origin. Startup is tied to explicit CLI use or service installation; the reviewed source does not establish unrelated credential or command-output exfiltration.
Evidence
dist/index.js<configured bridge state>/config.json<configured bridge state>/pending-invite<bridge state>/codex/auth.json
Network endpoints1
api.agentvault.chat
Decision evidence
public snapshotAI called this Clean at 89.0% confidence as Benign with low false-positive risk.
Evidence for AI clean decision
- The manifest identifies this as an AgentVault bridge and exposes the bundle as both the main entry and CLI.
- The Codex driver parses the child process's structured turn output as the model reply.
- The CLI defaults to the AgentVault API and accepts only HTTPS API origins without embedded credentials, query strings, or fragments.
- Bridge startup is reached through the CLI's start path; the bundle calls main only when invoked as the entrypoint.
Evidence against
- The bundle uses child processes and network requests, matching its stated purpose as a Codex bridge.
- The `prepublishOnly` script builds the package; no install lifecycle hook is declared.
- The reviewed source shows no automatic forwarding of unrelated credentials or command output to an unrelated collector.
Behavioral surface
ChildProcessCryptoEnvironmentVarsFilesystemNetworkShellWebSocket
Source & flagged code
9 flaggeddist/index.jsView file
104831await init_bridge();
L104832: import { spawn as spawn2 } from "node:child_process";
L104833: import { realpathSync } from "node:fs";
...
L104843: checkBinary: checkVersion,
L104844: output: (text) => process.stdout.write(text + "\n"),
L104845: command: (binary, args2, options = {}) => new Promise((resolve4, reject) => {
L104846: const child = spawn2(binary, args2, { env: options.env ?? { PATH: "/usr/bin:/bin", HOME: process.env.HOME, XDG_RUNTIME_DIR: process.env.XDG_RUNTIME_DIR, DBUS_SESSION_BUS_ADDRESS: p...
Critical
Command Output Exfiltration
Source executes local commands and sends command output to an external endpoint.
dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L104831104831Trigger-reachable chain: manifest.main -> dist/index.js
L104831: await init_bridge();
L104832: import { spawn as spawn2 } from "node:child_process";
L104833: import { realpathSync } from "node:fs";
...
L104843: checkBinary: checkVersion,
L104844: output: (text) => process.stdout.write(text + "\n"),
L104845: command: (binary, args2, options = {}) => new Promise((resolve4, reject) => {
L104846: const child = spawn2(binary, args2, { env: options.env ?? { PATH: "/usr/bin:/bin", HOME: process.env.HOME, XDG_RUNTIME_DIR: process.env.XDG_RUNTIME_DIR, DBUS_SESSION_BUS_ADDRESS: p...
Critical
Trigger Reachable Dangerous Capability
A package entrypoint or install-time lifecycle script reaches a source file with blocking dangerous behavior.
dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L104831Findings
2 Critical6 High5 Medium5 Low
CriticalCommand Output Exfiltrationdist/index.js
CriticalTrigger Reachable Dangerous Capabilitydist/index.js
HighChild Processdist/index.js
HighShell
HighSame File Env Network Executiondist/index.js
HighCredential Redirect Persistencedist/index.js
HighTrigger Reachable Command Output Exfiltrationdist/index.js
HighSemantic Analysis Limiteddist/index.js
MediumNetwork
MediumEnvironment Vars
MediumOversized Source Filedist/index.js
MediumOversized Cli Entrypointdist/index.js
MediumStructural Risk Force Deep Review
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @agentvault/openai-bridge@0.1.17.
The versions list below shows the verdict for each recorded version.
- Review the evidence and your use of @agentvault/openai-bridge@0.1.17 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
Think this verdict is wrong? Dispute it on GitHub or read how reports are produced.