registry / @aifinpay/agent
@aifinpay/agent
AiFinPay SDK for global Agent Passport identity and route-verified AIFP-1/AIFP-2 settlement for autonomous AI agents.
This report shows the evidence for @aifinpay/agent@2.12.1. 0 of 22 known versions are blocked or flagged. See all versions.
AI Security Review
scanned 3d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe flagged wallet-draining behavior is the SDK's caller-invoked payment and bridge functionality. The only declared publishing lifecycle hook builds the package, and the reviewed quote flow sends transaction parameters and addresses to LiFi without transmitting private keys.
Static reason
High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.
Trigger
A consuming application explicitly calls a payment or bridge execution API.
Impact
Funds may move according to the caller's requested transaction; no automatic transfer or key exfiltration was identified.
Mechanism
The SDK uses the configured wallet to sign the requested transaction and sends bridge quote requests to LiFi.
AI rationale
The flagged wallet-draining behavior is the SDK's caller-invoked payment and bridge functionality. The only declared publishing lifecycle hook builds the package, and the reviewed quote flow sends transaction parameters and addresses to LiFi without transmitting private keys.
Network endpoints1
li.quest/v1
Decision evidence
public snapshotAI called this Clean at 94.0% confidence as Benign with low false-positive risk.
Evidence for AI clean decision
- The only install-adjacent lifecycle script is prepublishOnly, which runs the package build.
- Wallet identity loading reads configured local environment or keystore values; missing or invalid configuration fails before network calls.
- Cross-chain execution is an explicit bridgeExecute(quote) method that delegates to the bridge executor.
- The LiFi quote request sends chain, token, amount, and wallet-address fields to the documented public API; it does not include private key material.
- The bridge executor submits the transaction from the supplied quote only when called, using the configured wallet account.
Evidence against
- The SDK can sign and submit cryptocurrency transactions, including cross-chain transfers, when its caller invokes those APIs. This is a consequential capability consistent with the package's payment purpose.
Behavioral surface
CryptoEnvironmentVarsFilesystemNetwork
HighEntropyStrings
Source & flagged code
4 flaggeddist/unifiedAgent.jsView file
16import { createPublicClient, createWalletClient, http, keccak256, toHex, toFunctionSelector, formatEther, } from "viem";
L17: import { privateKeyToAccount } from "viem/accounts";
L18: import { viemWalletClientWallet } from "./agentWallet.js";
...
L173: const TRANSPORT_OVERRIDE = {
L174: polygon: { defaultRpc: "https://polygon.drpc.org" },
L175: botchain: { defaultRpc: "https://rpc.botchain.ai", explorer: "https://scan.botchain.ai" },
...
L328: // Ordering it the other way — as 1.3.2 shipped — makes the default base fetch
L329: // the SPA shell and die inside JSON.parse.
L330: const DEFAULT_REGISTRY_PATHS = ["/api/providers", "/providers"];
...
L376: this.polygonRpc = opts.polygonRpc ?? opts.evmRpcUrls?.polygon ?? "https://polygon.drpc.org";
L377: this.solanaRpc = opts.solanaRpc ?? pro
Critical
Wallet Drain
Source uses private key material to transfer cryptocurrency funds.
dist/unifiedAgent.jsView on unpkg · L1616Trigger-reachable chain: manifest.main -> dist/index.js -> dist/unifiedAgent.js
L16: import { createPublicClient, createWalletClient, http, keccak256, toHex, toFunctionSelector, formatEther, } from "viem";
L17: import { privateKeyToAccount } from "viem/accounts";
L18: import { viemWalletClientWallet } from "./agentWallet.js";
...
L173: const TRANSPORT_OVERRIDE = {
L174: polygon: { defaultRpc: "https://polygon.drpc.org" },
L175: botchain: { defaultRpc: "https://rpc.botchain.ai", explorer: "https://scan.botchain.ai" },
...
L328: // Ordering it the other way — as 1.3.2 shipped — makes the default base fetch
L329: // the SPA shell and die inside JSON.parse.
L330: const DEFAULT_REGISTRY_PATHS = ["/api/providers", "/providers"];
...
L376: this.polygonRpc = opts.polygonRpc ?? opts.evmRpcUrls?.pol
Findings
2 Critical1 High3 Medium6 Low
CriticalWallet Draindist/unifiedAgent.js
CriticalTrigger Reachable Dangerous Capabilitydist/unifiedAgent.js
HighSemantic Analysis Limiteddist/crossChain.js#virtual:normalized:round1
MediumNetwork
MediumEnvironment Vars
MediumStructural Risk Force Deep Review
LowNon Install Lifecycle Scripts
LowScripts Present
LowFilesystem
LowHigh Entropy Strings
LowUrl Strings
LowSuspicious Lifecycle Evidencepackage.json
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @aifinpay/agent@2.12.1.
The versions list below shows the verdict for each recorded version.
- Review the evidence and your use of @aifinpay/agent@2.12.1 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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