registry / @bongos/core / 1.20.33

@bongos/core@1.20.33

Cloud Bongos — the AI-first build platform core (GDS + platform surfaces + module system), installed as a versioned dependency (ADR 0108).

AI Security Review

scanned 5d ago · by lpm-firewall-ai

The manifest has no install lifecycle script, and the reviewed agent setup is initiated through the CLI with package-only settings limited to permissions. The flagged runtime and test matches resolve to path normalization, lint output, secret-redaction tests, and prompt-fencing tests, with no confirmed attack behavior.

Static reason

High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.

Trigger

A user runs a CLI command such as initialization or upgrade; the manifest has no npm install lifecycle trigger.

Impact

No automatic credential transfer, unauthorized account action, or install-time mutation was established.

Mechanism

The package materializes skills and local permission settings. Package-only setup adds no hooks, and existing settings are preserved or receive missing credential-deny rules.

AI rationale

Decision evidence

public snapshot

AI called this Clean at 91.0% confidence as Benign with low false-positive risk.

Evidence for AI clean decision

The manifest exposes a CLI and server entrypoint, declares dependencies, and contains no npm lifecycle script; the CLI dispatches user-selected verbs.
Claude setup is reached through CLI onboarding or upgrade. Package-only materialization writes permission settings without hooks, and existing settings are preserved or receive only missing credential-deny rules.
The runtime matches resolve to URL path normalization and a skill linter that checks touched skill files and prints warnings; they do not establish account actions.
The secret and prompt-injection matches are test cases for secret redaction and prompt fencing; the fitness check describes local git and filesystem measurements.

Evidence against

Behavioral surface

Source

ChildProcessCryptoDynamicRequireEnvironmentVarsEvalFilesystemNetworkShell

Supply chain

HighEntropyStringsMinified

Source & flagged code

23 flagged

tests/public_mirror_export.mjsView file

103patternName = aws_access_key severity = critical line = 103

Critical

Critical Secret

Package contains a critical-looking secret pattern.

tests/public_mirror_export.mjsView on unpkg · L103

103patternName = aws_access_key severity = critical line = 103

Critical

Secret Pattern

AWS access key ID in tests/public_mirror_export.mjs

tests/public_mirror_export.mjsView on unpkg · L103

bin/bongos.jsView file

19const path = require('node:path'); L20: const { spawnSync } = require('node:child_process'); L21:

High

Child Process

Package source references child process execution.

bin/bongos.jsView on unpkg · L19

18L19: const path = require('node:path'); L20: const { spawnSync } = require('node:child_process');

Medium

Dynamic Require

Package source references dynamic require/import behavior.

bin/bongos.jsView on unpkg · L18

scripts/setup-builder.jsView file

71// and never spread from caller-supplied opts: shell:true on Windows runs the L72: // args through cmd.exe expansion, so it's used ONLY for `npm` (a .cmd shim that L73: // can't be spawned without a shell) and ONLY with hardcoded args — never with

High

Shell

Package source references shell execution.

scripts/setup-builder.jsView on unpkg · L71

public-docs/redoc.standalone.jsView file

8patternName = generic_password severity = medium line = 8

Medium

Secret Pattern

Hardcoded password in public-docs/redoc.standalone.js

public-docs/redoc.standalone.jsView on unpkg · L8

1/*! For license information please see redoc.standalone.js.LICENSE.txt */ L2: !function(e,t){"object"==typeof exports&&"object"==typeof module?module.exports=t(require("null")):"function"==typeof define&&define.amd?define(["null"],t):"object"==typeof exports... L3: || (${a} == "string" && ${i} && ${i} == +${i})`).assign(l,s._`+${i}`);case"integer":return void n.elseIf(s._`${a} === "boolean" || ${i} === null

Low

Eval

Package source references a known benign dynamic code generation pattern.

public-docs/redoc.standalone.jsView on unpkg · L1

tests/hall_profile_world.mjsView file

38// node modules/ui-design/kit/render.js --states modules/hall-ui/public/profile.states.json \ L39: // --base-in http://builders.localhost:4621 --base-out http://builders.localhost:4621 L40: ... L169: }, L170: console, Date, Map, Set, Math, Number, String, Array, Infinity, URLSearchParams, L171: }; ... L184: // deep-equal against a literal here fails on identity alone; compare the data. L185: const plain = (v) => JSON.parse(JSON.stringify(v)); L186: ... L354: assert.ok(own.mount.innerHTML.includes('id="chart-rate"'), 'and the pace chart draws'); L355: assert.ok(own.mount.innerHTML.includes('only you see this one'), 'saying plainly that it is private'); L356: });

Medium

Unsafe Vm Context

Package source executes code through a VM context API.

tests/hall_profile_world.mjsView on unpkg · L38

scripts/gds/fitness-ratchets.jsView file

246knipSkipReason = `no knip in ${path.join(ROOT, 'node_modules')} — ` L247: + 'npx would resolve one from outside this tree and report it as an unlisted ' L248: + 'binary, scoring one higher than the same code scores in CI (task 1003987)'; ... L252: try { L253: raw = execSync('npx --no-install knip --reporter json --no-exit-code', { L254: cwd: ROOT, encoding: 'utf8', maxBuffer: 32 * 1024 * 1024, stdio: ['ignore', 'pipe', 'pipe'],

High

Runtime Package Install

Package source invokes a package manager install command at runtime.

scripts/gds/fitness-ratchets.jsView on unpkg · L246

39const crypto = require('crypto'); L40: const { execFileSync, execSync } = require('child_process'); L41: L42: const ROOT = path.resolve(__dirname, '..', '..'); L43: const BASELINE_PATH = path.join(ROOT, 'config', 'fitness-baselines.json'); ... L89: for (let i = 0; i + window <= lines.length; i++) { L90: const h = crypto.createHash('sha1').update(lines.slice(i, i + window).join('\n')).digest('base64'); L91: let set = filesByHash.get(h); ... L208: // main checkout (knip local) -> 221 L209: // worktree (knip ambient) -> 222, the extra being `binaries: package.json knip` L210: // Diffed by name, the exports lists were IDENTICAL (221 both sides). knip was ... L256: } catch (e) {

Low

Weak Crypto

Package source references weak cryptographic algorithms.

scripts/gds/fitness-ratchets.jsView on unpkg · L39

modules/ui-design/kit/serve.jsView file

27// Exit 2 on a surface that does not resolve. Prints ONE line when listening L28: // ("stub on http://…") — render.js and probe.js wait for it. L29: const http = require('node:http'); ... L33: const crypto = require('node:crypto'); L34: const { spawnSync } = require('node:child_process'); L35: const lib = require('./lib.js'); L36: L37: const ROOT = process.env.STUB_REPO ? path.resolve(process.env.STUB_REPO) : lib.REPO_ROOT; L38: const SURFACE = process.env.SURFACE || 'public-landing';

High

Same File Env Network Execution

A single source file combines environment access, network access, and code or shell execution; review context before blocking.

modules/ui-design/kit/serve.jsView on unpkg · L27

scripts/gds/build-bongos.jsView file

24const path = require('node:path'); L25: const { spawnSync } = require('node:child_process'); L26: const { arg } = require('./cli-lib'); L27: L28: const REPO_ROOT = path.join(__dirname, '..', '..'); L29: const ENTRY = path.join(REPO_ROOT, 'bin', 'bongos.js'); ... L42: function bunPresent() { L43: const r = spawnSync('bun', ['--version'], { encoding: 'utf8', shell: process.platform === 'win32' }); L44: return !!r && !r.error && r.status === 0; ... L66: console.error('✖ `bun` is required to compile the standalone binary but was not found.'); L67: console.error(' Install it (https://bun.sh) — e.g. `curl -fsSL https://bun.sh/install | bash` —'); L68: console.error(' or in CI use the oven-sh/setup-bun action. Then re-run.');

High

Sandbox Evasion Gated Capability

Source gates dangerous network, credential, or execution behavior behind CI, host, platform, time, or geo fingerprint checks.

scripts/gds/build-bongos.jsView on unpkg · L24

modules/security/artifact-scan/fetch.jsView file

10L11: const dns = require('node:dns'); L12: const fsp = require('node:fs/promises'); L13: const path = require('node:path'); L14: const { spawn } = require('node:child_process'); L15: ... L19: const MAX_CAPTURE_BYTES = 1 * 1024 * 1024; L20: // git's stderr can name internal hosts and paths; only a short excerpt travels, L21: // and only in a finding's detail, never in a message a caller might echo. ... L50: if (a === 0) return 'the unspecified range'; L51: if (a === 10) return 'a private (RFC 1918) address'; L52: if (a === 172 && b >= 16 && b <= 31) return 'a private (RFC 1918) address';

High

Cloud Metadata Access

Source reaches cloud instance metadata or link-local credential endpoints.

modules/security/artifact-scan/fetch.jsView on unpkg · L10

tests/grader_prompt_fencing.mjsView file

74contains invisible/control Unicode U+202E (right-to-left override) const dirty = `a${'<U+202E>'}b${'<U+202D>'}c${'<U+202A>'}d`;

Critical

Trojan Source Unicode

Source contains bidi control or invisible Unicode characters associated with Trojan Source attacks.

tests/grader_prompt_fencing.mjsView on unpkg · L74

docker-entrypoint.shView file

•path = docker-entrypoint.sh kind = build_helper sizeBytes = 1075 magicHex = [redacted]

Medium

Ships Build Helper

Package ships non-JavaScript build or shell helper files.

docker-entrypoint.shView on unpkg

modules/autonomy/pollers/routine-timers.js#virtual:normalized:round1View file

•stage = ast_semantic_analysis; reason = ast_parse_error; limitedFiles = 85

High

Semantic Analysis Limited

A bounded semantic-analysis stage reached its safety limit; remaining detectors completed, but this package requires AI review.

modules/autonomy/pollers/routine-timers.js#virtual:normalized:round1View on unpkg

tests/audit_middleware.mjsView file

365patternName = generic_password severity = medium line = 365

Medium

Secret Pattern

Hardcoded password in tests/audit_middleware.mjs

tests/audit_middleware.mjsView on unpkg · L365

tests/provision.mjsView file

3053patternName = generic_password severity = medium line = 3053

Medium

Secret Pattern

Hardcoded password in tests/provision.mjs

tests/provision.mjsView on unpkg · L3053

3091patternName = generic_password severity = medium line = 3091

Medium

Secret Pattern

Hardcoded password in tests/provision.mjs

tests/provision.mjsView on unpkg · L3091

tests/auto_merge_diagnosis.mjsView file

297patternName = github_pat severity = critical line = 297

Critical

Secret Pattern

GitHub personal access token in tests/auto_merge_diagnosis.mjs

tests/auto_merge_diagnosis.mjsView on unpkg · L297

tests/logger.mjsView file

62patternName = github_pat severity = critical line = 62

Critical

Secret Pattern

GitHub personal access token in tests/logger.mjs

tests/logger.mjsView on unpkg · L62

tests/secret_gate.mjsView file

21patternName = github_pat severity = critical line = 21

Critical

Secret Pattern

GitHub personal access token in tests/secret_gate.mjs

tests/secret_gate.mjsView on unpkg · L21

tests/key-status.mjsView file

25patternName = google_api_key severity = high line = 25

High

Secret Pattern

Google API key in tests/key-status.mjs

tests/key-status.mjsView on unpkg · L25

Source & flagged code

23 flagged · loading source

tests/public_mirror_export.mjsView file

103patternName = aws_access_key severity = critical line = 103

Critical

Critical Secret

Package contains a critical-looking secret pattern.

tests/public_mirror_export.mjsView on unpkg · L103

103patternName = aws_access_key severity = critical line = 103

Critical

Secret Pattern

AWS access key ID in tests/public_mirror_export.mjs

tests/public_mirror_export.mjsView on unpkg · L103

bin/bongos.jsView file

19const path = require('node:path'); L20: const { spawnSync } = require('node:child_process'); L21:

High

Child Process

Package source references child process execution.

bin/bongos.jsView on unpkg · L19

Findings

6 Critical8 High10 Medium7 Low

CriticalCritical Secrettests/public_mirror_export.mjs

CriticalTrojan Source Unicodetests/grader_prompt_fencing.mjs

CriticalSecret Patterntests/public_mirror_export.mjs

CriticalSecret Patterntests/auto_merge_diagnosis.mjs

CriticalSecret Patterntests/logger.mjs

CriticalSecret Patterntests/secret_gate.mjs

HighChild Processbin/bongos.js

HighShellscripts/setup-builder.js

HighSame File Env Network Executionmodules/ui-design/kit/serve.js

HighSandbox Evasion Gated Capabilityscripts/gds/build-bongos.js

HighCloud Metadata Accessmodules/security/artifact-scan/fetch.js

Affected versions and remediation

This report applies to @bongos/core@1.20.33.

See all versions of @bongos/core for other recorded verdicts.

Review the evidence and your use of @bongos/core@1.20.33 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.

Evidence last updated: 2026-10-18 01:01:10.952Z (UTC).

Think this verdict is wrong? Dispute it on GitHub or read how reports are produced.