registry / AI-agent control-surface risk / @bongos/core

@bongos/core

Cloud Bongos — the AI-first build platform core (GDS + platform surfaces + module system), installed as a versioned dependency (ADR 0108).

This report shows the evidence for @bongos/core@1.19.754. 1 of 227 known versions is blocked or flagged. The newest version, 1.21.115, is allowed. See all versions.

AI Security Review

scanned 15d ago · by lpm-firewall-ai

The package has no npm install lifecycle hook, but its devcontainer setup automatically changes Claude Code's user-level permission mode to bypass prompts. That permission bypass is a concrete agent control-surface risk.

Static reason

High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.; previous stored version diff introduced dangerous source

Trigger

The devcontainer post-create script runs during container setup.

Impact

Claude Code can proceed without its usual permission prompts in that environment.

Mechanism

The script writes bypassPermissions as the default mode in the user's Claude settings.

Policy narrative

When the devcontainer is created, its post-create script changes the user's Claude Code default permission mode to bypass prompts. This is a concrete weakening of agent approval controls, so the finding warrants a block.

AI rationale

Evidence

.devcontainer/post-create.sh$HOME/.claude/settings.json

Decision evidence

public snapshot

AI identified this as a dangerous AI-agent capability at 94.0% confidence with low false-positive risk.

Evidence for policy risk

The devcontainer first-run script sets Claude Code to bypass permission prompts for an unattended environment.
It writes that permission mode into the user's Claude settings file, weakening the agent's approval controls.

Evidence against

package.json defines no install lifecycle hooks; the risky configuration change is in devcontainer provisioning.
The CLI dispatches user-selected scripts when invoked and does not run this setup automatically on package import.

Behavioral surface

Source

ChildProcessCryptoDynamicRequireEnvironmentVarsEvalFilesystemNetworkShell

Supply chain

HighEntropyStringsMinifiedTelemetryUrlStrings

Manifest

CopyleftLicense

scanned 1,437 file(s), 20.9 MB of source, external domains: 0.0.0.0, 1.1.1.1, 10.0.0.5, 127.0.0.1, 169.254.169.254, 172.16.0.9, 192.168.1.10, 4.4.4.4, 8.8.8.8, 9.9.9.9, a.b.c.project.example, a.b.example, a.example, a.example.com, a.long.example, abc.trycloudflare.com, acme.example, acme.example.org, aistudio.google.com, alpha.example, amazonprimea.com, anything.example, api.cloudflare.com, api.digitalocean.com, api.example.com, api.example.test, api.github.com, app.example.com, app.localhost, attacker.example, avatars.example, avatars.example.com, avatars.githubusercontent.com, b.example.com, bad.example, bar.pages.example, beta.example, box.example.com, brand.example, builders.acme.example.org, builders.amazonprimea.com, builders.cloudbongos.com, builders.cloudbongos.example, builders.example.com, builders.good.example, builders.localhost, builders.p07.example, builders.project.example, builders.spike-harbor.example, bun.sh

Source & flagged code

23 flagged

tests/public_mirror_export.mjsView file

Lines 83-123javascript

83 assert.equal(isBinary(Buffer.from('plain text file\nwith lines')), false);

84 assert.equal(isBinary(Buffer.from('')), false);

85});

87// ── redactBlob ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────

88t('redactBlob redacts a text blob and reports zero leaks', () => {

89 const r = redactBlob({ buf: Buffer.from('serve https://widgetco.com to zoltan at 8.8.8.8'), rules, sensitiveLiterals, envSecrets: [] });

90 const text = r.buf.toString('utf8');

91 assert.ok(!/widgetco|zoltan|8\.8\.8\.8/i.test(text), text);

92 assert.deepEqual(r.leaks, []);

93 assert.equal(r.secret, false);

94});

95t('redactBlob keeps a binary blob verbatim but still leak-scans it', () => {

96 const bin = Buffer.concat([Buffer.from('PNG\x00'), Buffer.from('widgetco'), Buffer.from('\x00')]);

97 const r = redactBlob({ buf: bin, rules, sensitiveLiterals, envSecrets: [] });

98 assert.ok(r.buf.equals(bin), 'binary must be byte-identical (not corrupted by text redaction)');

99 assert.ok(r.leaks.length > 0, 'a literal embedded in a binary must still trip the gate');

100});

101t('redactBlob SCRUBS a secret shape from a text blob (handled, not leaked)', () => {

102 const r = redactBlob({ buf: Buffer.from('key AKIA' + 'ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOP here'), rules, sensitiveLiterals, envSecrets: [] });

103 assert.ok(!r.buf.toString('utf8').includes('AKIAABCDEFGHIJKLMNOP'), 'the secret must be scrubbed from the published text');

Critical

Critical Secret

Package contains a critical-looking secret pattern.

tests/public_mirror_export.mjsView on unpkg · L103

104 assert.equal(r.secret, false, 'a scrubbed text secret is handled, so it is not a residual leak');

105});

106// Regression (task 1003873). The secret verdict audits THIS call's own scrub, so it has to

107// share the scrub's knownDocNames allowlist. When it did not, the audit re-redacted the ADR

108// filename the scrub had just spared, read the difference as a leak, and failed the packager

109// closed on every doc in the tree — the publish lane stayed red for seven core releases.

110t('redactBlob reports no secret for an allowlisted doc filename (the gate agrees with its own scrub)', () => {

111 const name = '0281-differential-audit-allowlist-symmetry.md';

112 const knownDocNames = new Set([name]);

113 const r = redactBlob({ buf: Buffer.from(`see [ADR 0281](docs/adr/${name}) for why`), rules, sensitiveLiterals, envSecrets: [], knownDocNames });

114 assert.ok(r.buf.toString('utf8').includes(name), 'the allowlisted filename must survive the scrub');

115 assert.equal(r.secret, false, 'and must not then be reported as a residual secret');

116 assert.deepEqual(r.leaks, []);

117});

118t('redactBlob FAILS CLOSED on a secret inside a BINARY blob (cannot safely rewrite it)', () => {

119 const bin = Buffer.concat([Buffer.from('BIN\x00'), Buffer.from('AKIA' + 'ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOP')]);

120 const r = redactBlob({ buf: bin, rules, sensitiveLiterals, envSecrets: [] });

121 assert.ok(r.buf.equals(bin), 'binary kept verbatim');

122 assert.equal(r.secret, true, 'a secret in a binary must trip the gate (the export then publishes nothing)');

123});

103patternName = aws_access_key severity = critical line = 103

Critical

Secret Pattern

AWS access key ID in tests/public_mirror_export.mjs

tests/public_mirror_export.mjsView on unpkg · L103

bin/bongos.jsView file

Lines 1-40javascript

1#!/usr/bin/env node

2// bin/bongos.js — the Cloud Bongos CLI dispatcher.

3//

4// GDS-V4 · V4.R79 · task 1246 (Phase 1 of the `bongos` toolkit; epic 1245).

5//

6// A single `bongos <verb>` front door over the existing scripts/gds/* scripts —

7// the same actions the /builder-* slash-commands run inside Claude Code, now

8// usable from any terminal, VS Code, a Chromebook, or CI. This is deliberately a

9// THIN dispatcher: it spawns the target script with `process.execPath` (the one

10// guaranteed cross-platform runtime — no bash, #686) and forwards argv + exit

scripts/gds/cli-lib.jsView file

Lines 391-431javascript

391}

392

393// ---- argv helpers (C11) ---------------------------------------------------

394// One home for the flag parsing every GDS CLI rolled by hand. Two contracts:

395// arg(name) → the flag's VALUE ('--out x' or '--out=x'), else null

396// hasFlag(name) → boolean presence ('--json', '--no-write')

397// Both default `args` to process.argv.slice(2). arg() accepts BOTH the space and

398// `=` forms (the superset — space-only callers gain `=` for free, harmlessly).

399// A presence flag wants hasFlag(), NOT arg() — they are opposite contracts

400// (repo-metrics.js learned this the hard way; do not collapse the two).

public-docs/redoc.standalone.jsView file

8patternName = generic_password severity = medium line = 8

Medium

Secret Pattern

Hardcoded password in public-docs/redoc.standalone.js

public-docs/redoc.standalone.jsView on unpkg · L8

1/*! For license information please see redoc.standalone.js.LICENSE.txt */ L2: !function(e,t){"object"==typeof exports&&"object"==typeof module?module.exports=t(require("null")):"function"==typeof define&&define.amd?define(["null"],t):"object"==typeof exports... L3: || (${a} == "string" && ${i} && ${i} == +${i})`).assign(l,s._`+${i}`);case"integer":return void n.elseIf(s._`${a} === "boolean" || ${i} === null

Low

Eval

Package source references a known benign dynamic code generation pattern.

public-docs/redoc.standalone.jsView on unpkg · L1

tests/hall_profile_world.mjsView file

Lines 18-58javascript

18// ledgers are one key over, so the first screen is a screen.

19// * THE CHARTS ARE ARITHMETIC FIRST. cumulativeByDay folds two ships on one

20// day into one point and accumulates, over whichever timestamp the caller

21// names; craftMix folds the tail past seven into "other" rather than

22// minting an eighth hue; weeklyBuckets is a time axis (every week present,

23// empty or not).

24// * DRACHMAE COME FROM THE LEDGER (task 1003491). The earned line is the

25// credits ledger — /me/credits on your own profile, /builders/:id/credits

26// on another's — `delta` cumulated by `recorded_at`, so it ends at the

scripts/gds/box-connect-lib.jsView file

Lines 10-50javascript

10// with the GDS — so a FRESH laptop with no prior setup still connects.

11// 2. Wake/provision the box (POST /box/ensure) and poll (GET /box/me) until it

12// is active and has a hostname (DNS is repointed on every wake/provision, so

13// we always connect by hostname, never a cached IP).

14// 3. Pin the box's reported host keys into ~/.ssh/known_hosts (authoritative,

15// survives a re-provision) and write a marker-delimited Host alias into

16// ~/.ssh/config (User root + the box key) so the system OpenSSH client — the

17// one VS Code Remote-SSH drives — resolves the box the same way every time.

18// 4. Hand off to `ssh` / `code`.

modules/ui-design/kit/serve.jsView file

Lines 7-47javascript

7// module may not require core and the doorway may not import the serving domain,

8// so the real code path is reached as a child process) — plus the content-hash

9// ?v= stamp, with the instance's own branding pack. Answers the public feeds from

10// fixtures/ so a page boots with real-shaped data and no database. Serves docs/

11// raw so a mock under docs/design/mocks/ renders with its relative links.

12//

13// node modules/ui-design/kit/serve.js -> http://127.0.0.1:3412/ (the public-landing module)

14// SURFACE=<dir or module key> a checkout dir ("modules/hall-ui/public") or a module

15// key ("public-landing") whose manifest declares a webSurfaces dir

scripts/gds/build-bongos.jsView file

24const path = require('node:path'); L25: const { spawnSync } = require('node:child_process'); L26: const { arg } = require('./cli-lib'); L27: L28: const REPO_ROOT = path.join(__dirname, '..', '..'); L29: const ENTRY = path.join(REPO_ROOT, 'bin', 'bongos.js'); ... L42: function bunPresent() { L43: const r = spawnSync('bun', ['--version'], { encoding: 'utf8', shell: process.platform === 'win32' }); L44: return !!r && !r.error && r.status === 0; ... L66: console.error('✖ `bun` is required to compile the standalone binary but was not found.'); L67: console.error(' Install it (https://bun.sh) — e.g. `curl -fsSL https://bun.sh/install | bash` —'); L68: console.error(' or in CI use the oven-sh/setup-bun action. Then re-run.');

High

Sandbox Evasion Gated Capability

Source gates dangerous network, credential, or execution behavior behind CI, host, platform, time, or geo fingerprint checks.

scripts/gds/build-bongos.jsView on unpkg · L24

modules/security/artifact-scan/fetch.jsView file

10L11: const dns = require('node:dns'); L12: const fsp = require('node:fs/promises'); L13: const path = require('node:path'); L14: const { spawn } = require('node:child_process'); L15: ... L19: const MAX_CAPTURE_BYTES = 1 * 1024 * 1024; L20: // git's stderr can name internal hosts and paths; only a short excerpt travels, L21: // and only in a finding's detail, never in a message a caller might echo. ... L50: if (a === 0) return 'the unspecified range'; L51: if (a === 10) return 'a private (RFC 1918) address'; L52: if (a === 172 && b >= 16 && b <= 31) return 'a private (RFC 1918) address';

High

Cloud Metadata Access

Source reaches cloud instance metadata or link-local credential endpoints.

modules/security/artifact-scan/fetch.jsView on unpkg · L10

tests/grader_prompt_fencing.mjsView file

74contains invisible/control Unicode U+202E (right-to-left override) const dirty = `a${'<U+202E>'}b${'<U+202D>'}c${'<U+202A>'}d`;

Critical

Trojan Source Unicode

Source contains bidi control or invisible Unicode characters associated with Trojan Source attacks.

tests/grader_prompt_fencing.mjsView on unpkg · L74

.devcontainer/post-create.shView file

•path = .devcontainer/post-create.sh kind = payload_in_excluded_dir sizeBytes = 7543 magicHex = [redacted]

High

Payload In Excluded Dir

Package hides binary, compressed, or executable-looking payloads in test/fixture/hidden paths.

.devcontainer/post-create.shView on unpkg

•path = .devcontainer/post-create.sh kind = build_helper sizeBytes = 7543 magicHex = [redacted]

Medium

Ships Build Helper

Package ships non-JavaScript build or shell helper files.

.devcontainer/post-create.shView on unpkg

modules/autonomy/pollers/routine-timers.js#virtual:normalized:round1View file

•stage = ast_semantic_analysis; reason = ast_parse_error; limitedFiles = 74

High

Semantic Analysis Limited

A bounded semantic-analysis stage reached its safety limit; remaining detectors completed, but this package requires AI review.

modules/autonomy/pollers/routine-timers.js#virtual:normalized:round1View on unpkg

scripts/gds/upgrade.jsView file

•matchType = previous_version_dangerous_delta matchedPackage = @bongos/core@1.19.740 matchedIdentity = npm:QGJvbmdvcy9jb3Jl:1.19.740 similarity = 0.967 summary = stored previous version shares package body but lacks this dangerous source file

High

Previous Version Dangerous Delta

This package version adds a dangerous source file absent from the previous stored version; route for source-aware review.

scripts/gds/upgrade.jsView on unpkg

tests/audit_middleware.mjsView file

365patternName = generic_password severity = medium line = 365

Medium

Secret Pattern

Hardcoded password in tests/audit_middleware.mjs

tests/audit_middleware.mjsView on unpkg · L365

tests/provision.mjsView file

2530patternName = generic_password severity = medium line = 2530

Medium

Secret Pattern

Hardcoded password in tests/provision.mjs

tests/provision.mjsView on unpkg · L2530

2568patternName = generic_password severity = medium line = 2568

Medium

Secret Pattern

Hardcoded password in tests/provision.mjs

tests/provision.mjsView on unpkg · L2568

tests/logger.mjsView file

62patternName = github_pat severity = critical line = 62

Critical

Secret Pattern

GitHub personal access token in tests/logger.mjs

tests/logger.mjsView on unpkg · L62

tests/secret_gate.mjsView file

21patternName = github_pat severity = critical line = 21

Critical

Secret Pattern

GitHub personal access token in tests/secret_gate.mjs

tests/secret_gate.mjsView on unpkg · L21

tests/key-status.mjsView file

25patternName = google_api_key severity = high line = 25

High

Secret Pattern

Google API key in tests/key-status.mjs

tests/key-status.mjsView on unpkg · L25

Source & flagged code

23 flagged · loading source

tests/public_mirror_export.mjsView file

103patternName = aws_access_key severity = critical line = 103

Critical

Critical Secret

Package contains a critical-looking secret pattern.

tests/public_mirror_export.mjsView on unpkg · L103

103patternName = aws_access_key severity = critical line = 103

Critical

Secret Pattern

AWS access key ID in tests/public_mirror_export.mjs

tests/public_mirror_export.mjsView on unpkg · L103

bin/bongos.jsView file

20const path = require('node:path'); L21: const { spawnSync } = require('node:child_process'); L22:

High

Child Process

Package source references child process execution.

bin/bongos.jsView on unpkg · L20

19L20: const path = require('node:path'); L21: const { spawnSync } = require('node:child_process');

Medium

Dynamic Require

Package source references dynamic require/import behavior.

bin/bongos.jsView on unpkg · L19

scripts/gds/cli-lib.jsView file

411L412: // stripBom(s) — remove a leading UTF-8 BOM (U+FEFF), the artifact PowerShell's L413: // `Out-File`/`>` redirection writes. JSON.parse does not strip it, so a

High

Shell

Package source references shell execution.

scripts/gds/cli-lib.jsView on unpkg · L411

public-docs/redoc.standalone.jsView file

8patternName = generic_password severity = medium line = 8

Medium

Secret Pattern

Hardcoded password in public-docs/redoc.standalone.js

public-docs/redoc.standalone.jsView on unpkg · L8

Low

Eval

Package source references a known benign dynamic code generation pattern.

public-docs/redoc.standalone.jsView on unpkg · L1

tests/hall_profile_world.mjsView file

38// node modules/ui-design/kit/render.js --states modules/hall-ui/public/profile.states.json \ L39: // --base-in http://builders.localhost:4621 --base-out http://builders.localhost:4621 L40: ... L162: }, L163: console, Date, Map, Set, Math, Number, String, Array, Infinity, URLSearchParams, L164: }; ... L177: // deep-equal against a literal here fails on identity alone; compare the data. L178: const plain = (v) => JSON.parse(JSON.stringify(v)); L179: ... L336: assert.ok(own.mount.innerHTML.includes('id="chart-rate"'), 'and the pace chart draws'); L337: assert.ok(own.mount.innerHTML.includes('only you see this one'), 'saying plainly that it is private'); L338: });

Medium

Unsafe Vm Context

Package source executes code through a VM context API.

tests/hall_profile_world.mjsView on unpkg · L38

scripts/gds/box-connect-lib.jsView file

30const crypto = require('node:crypto'); L31: const { spawnSync } = require('node:child_process'); L32: const ic = require('../../src/instance-config'); ... L113: try { L114: const key = Buffer.from(salt, 'base64'); L115: return wanted.some((n) => crypto.createHmac('sha1', key).update(n).digest('base64') === hash); ... L195: // Dev Box app + connect.sh both pin the fixed ~/.ssh/otb_builder default. L196: return ic.resolveEnv('SSH_KEY') || path.join(os.homedir(), '.ssh', 'otb_builder'); L197: } ... L208: encoding: 'utf8', L209: shell: process.platform === 'win32', L210: windowsHide: true,

Low

Weak Crypto

Package source references weak cryptographic algorithms.

scripts/gds/box-connect-lib.jsView on unpkg · L30

modules/ui-design/kit/serve.jsView file

27// Exit 2 on a surface that does not resolve. Prints ONE line when listening L28: // ("stub on http://…") — render.js and probe.js wait for it. L29: const http = require('node:http'); ... L33: const crypto = require('node:crypto'); L34: const { spawnSync } = require('node:child_process'); L35: const lib = require('./lib.js'); L36: L37: const ROOT = process.env.STUB_REPO ? path.resolve(process.env.STUB_REPO) : lib.REPO_ROOT; L38: const SURFACE = process.env.SURFACE || 'public-landing';

High

Same File Env Network Execution

A single source file combines environment access, network access, and code or shell execution; review context before blocking.

modules/ui-design/kit/serve.jsView on unpkg · L27

scripts/gds/build-bongos.jsView file

High

Sandbox Evasion Gated Capability

Source gates dangerous network, credential, or execution behavior behind CI, host, platform, time, or geo fingerprint checks.

scripts/gds/build-bongos.jsView on unpkg · L24

modules/security/artifact-scan/fetch.jsView file

High

Cloud Metadata Access

Source reaches cloud instance metadata or link-local credential endpoints.

modules/security/artifact-scan/fetch.jsView on unpkg · L10

tests/grader_prompt_fencing.mjsView file

74contains invisible/control Unicode U+202E (right-to-left override) const dirty = `a${'<U+202E>'}b${'<U+202D>'}c${'<U+202A>'}d`;

Critical

Trojan Source Unicode

Source contains bidi control or invisible Unicode characters associated with Trojan Source attacks.

tests/grader_prompt_fencing.mjsView on unpkg · L74

.devcontainer/post-create.shView file

•path = .devcontainer/post-create.sh kind = payload_in_excluded_dir sizeBytes = 7543 magicHex = [redacted]

High

Payload In Excluded Dir

Package hides binary, compressed, or executable-looking payloads in test/fixture/hidden paths.

.devcontainer/post-create.shView on unpkg

•path = .devcontainer/post-create.sh kind = build_helper sizeBytes = 7543 magicHex = [redacted]

Medium

Ships Build Helper

Package ships non-JavaScript build or shell helper files.

.devcontainer/post-create.shView on unpkg

modules/autonomy/pollers/routine-timers.js#virtual:normalized:round1View file

•stage = ast_semantic_analysis; reason = ast_parse_error; limitedFiles = 74

High

Semantic Analysis Limited

A bounded semantic-analysis stage reached its safety limit; remaining detectors completed, but this package requires AI review.

modules/autonomy/pollers/routine-timers.js#virtual:normalized:round1View on unpkg

scripts/gds/upgrade.jsView file

High

Previous Version Dangerous Delta

This package version adds a dangerous source file absent from the previous stored version; route for source-aware review.

scripts/gds/upgrade.jsView on unpkg

tests/audit_middleware.mjsView file

365patternName = generic_password severity = medium line = 365

Medium

Secret Pattern

Hardcoded password in tests/audit_middleware.mjs

tests/audit_middleware.mjsView on unpkg · L365

tests/provision.mjsView file

2530patternName = generic_password severity = medium line = 2530

Medium

Secret Pattern

Hardcoded password in tests/provision.mjs

tests/provision.mjsView on unpkg · L2530

2568patternName = generic_password severity = medium line = 2568

Medium

Secret Pattern

Hardcoded password in tests/provision.mjs

tests/provision.mjsView on unpkg · L2568

tests/logger.mjsView file

62patternName = github_pat severity = critical line = 62

Critical

Secret Pattern

GitHub personal access token in tests/logger.mjs

tests/logger.mjsView on unpkg · L62

tests/secret_gate.mjsView file

21patternName = github_pat severity = critical line = 21

Critical

Secret Pattern

GitHub personal access token in tests/secret_gate.mjs

tests/secret_gate.mjsView on unpkg · L21

tests/key-status.mjsView file

25patternName = google_api_key severity = high line = 25

High

Secret Pattern

Google API key in tests/key-status.mjs

tests/key-status.mjsView on unpkg · L25

Findings

5 Critical9 High10 Medium7 Low

CriticalCritical Secrettests/public_mirror_export.mjs

CriticalTrojan Source Unicodetests/grader_prompt_fencing.mjs

CriticalSecret Patterntests/public_mirror_export.mjs

CriticalSecret Patterntests/logger.mjs

CriticalSecret Patterntests/secret_gate.mjs

HighChild Processbin/bongos.js

HighShellscripts/gds/cli-lib.js

HighSame File Env Network Executionmodules/ui-design/kit/serve.js

HighSandbox Evasion Gated Capabilityscripts/gds/build-bongos.js

HighCloud Metadata Accessmodules/security/artifact-scan/fetch.js

HighPayload In Excluded Dir.devcontainer/post-create.sh

HighSemantic Analysis Limitedmodules/autonomy/pollers/routine-timers.js#virtual:normalized:round1

HighPrevious Version Dangerous Deltascripts/gds/upgrade.js

HighSecret Patterntests/key-status.mjs

MediumDynamic Requirebin/bongos.js

MediumUnsafe Vm Contexttests/hall_profile_world.mjs

MediumNetwork

MediumEnvironment Vars

MediumShips Build Helper.devcontainer/post-create.sh

MediumStructural Risk Force Deep Review

MediumSecret Patternpublic-docs/redoc.standalone.js

MediumSecret Patterntests/audit_middleware.mjs

MediumSecret Patterntests/provision.mjs

LowEvalpublic-docs/redoc.standalone.js

LowWeak Cryptoscripts/gds/box-connect-lib.js

LowFilesystem

LowHigh Entropy Strings

LowTelemetry

LowUrl Strings

LowCopyleft License

Affected versions and remediation

This report applies to @bongos/core@1.19.754.

The versions list below shows the verdict for each recorded version.

Avoid installing @bongos/core@1.19.754. Remove it from direct dependencies and check your lockfile for transitive copies.
Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
If this version ran, investigate the affected machine and build environment. Rotate credentials it could access and rebuild from a trusted environment.

Evidence last updated: 2026-10-08 13:56:18.093Z (UTC).

Think this verdict is wrong? Dispute it on GitHub or read how reports are produced.

Versions

227 known versions

Showing the 101 most recent of 227 known versions.

94%Malicious

AI assessment confidence

TypeSoft block: AI-agent control surface

False-positive riskLow

Review stagesource_first_review

Firewall policyWarn by default

This finding concerns changes to an AI agent's instructions or configuration without explicit user action. It does not by itself establish malware intent. The CLI warns by default and blocks when configured for this policy.

Package metadata

npm

Version1.19.754

Latest on npm1.21.69

PublishedSep 16, 2026

LicenseAGPL-3.0-or-later

Dependencies3

Integrityverified

Package size24.4 MB

Files2,620

Runtime surface

package.json

Entrypointsmain → src/platform-server.jsexports mapbin → bongos

Runtimenode >=22

Artifact46.5 MB · 2,620 files2 signature(s)

Install lifecycleNo scripts declared.

Behavioral surface

ChildProcessCryptoDynamicRequireEnvironmentVarsEvalFilesystemNetworkShellHighEntropyStringsMinifiedTelemetryUrlStringsCopyleftLicense

AI Security Review

Decision evidence

Source & flagged code

Source & flagged code

Findings

Affected versions and remediation

Versions

Related packages

Other AI-agent control-surface risk packages

Source & flagged code

Related packages

Other AI-agent control-surface risk packages