LPM blocks this version under the AI-agent control-surface policy. The package has an install-time control-surface mutation path: postinstall executes the package's native tsq binary to refresh bundled agent skills. The binary source is not present in this wrapper package, so the exact external write targets are not statically bounded here.
Static reason
One or more suspicious static signals were detected.
Trigger
npm install / postinstall
Impact
Unconsented lifecycle-time mutation of AI agent skill/control files via a native binary
Mechanism
postinstall downloads or resolves native binary, then executes `tsq skills refresh --json` with bundled SKILLS
Policy narrative
On installation, package.json runs scripts/postinstall.js. That script resolves or downloads a platform tsq binary, writes it under bin/, marks it executable, then invokes it with `skills refresh --json` while pointing TSQ_SKILLS_DIR at bundled SKILLS. This is an install-time agent skill refresh path, not merely a user-invoked CLI action.
Rationale
Native binary download is package-aligned for a CLI wrapper, but executing that binary during postinstall to refresh bundled agent skills is unconsented lifecycle AI-agent control-surface mutation. No credential theft or generic malware behavior was found in the JS source, but this install-time agent-control write path is enough to block. Product guard normalized a concrete AI-agent control hijack publish_block to the blockable dangerous-capability shape.
Evidence
package.jsonscripts/postinstall.jsbin/tsq.jsSKILLS/tasque/SKILL.mdbin/tsqbin/tsq.exebin/tsq-tuibin/tsq-tui.exe