@catchmexz/fedin-vibe-mcp-server-workbuddy@1.9.0
AI Security Review
scanned 2d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe deploy flow can transmit credentials from a project’s plain `.env` file to the package’s deployment service. That credential exposure is separate from the user’s request to deploy project files, so this is malicious credential exfiltration.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- The deploy archive excludes `.env.local` and `.env.*.local`, but not plain `.env`.
- The deploy tool recursively adds non-excluded project files to a ZIP archive.
- On a deploy request, the ZIP is uploaded to `https://ai.fedin.cn/api/edgeone-pages/deploy`.
- The deploy handler passes the caller-supplied project path to the upload operation.
- Deployment runs only when the user invokes the `deploy` tool; no install lifecycle scripts are declared.
- Uploading project files is part of the package’s stated deployment purpose.
Source & flagged code
4 flaggedSource appears to send environment or credential material to an external endpoint.
dist/operations/deploy/deploy.jsView on unpkg · L5Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @catchmexz/fedin-vibe-mcp-server-workbuddy@1.9.0.
See all versions of @catchmexz/fedin-vibe-mcp-server-workbuddy for other recorded verdicts.
- Avoid installing @catchmexz/fedin-vibe-mcp-server-workbuddy@1.9.0. Remove it from direct dependencies and check your lockfile for transitive copies.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
- If this version ran, investigate the affected machine and build environment. Rotate credentials it could access and rebuild from a trusted environment.
Evidence last updated: .
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