registry / Credential exfiltration / @gethookmyapp/cli
@gethookmyapp/cli
HookMyApp CLI, No BS. Just go live.
This report shows the evidence for @gethookmyapp/cli@0.14.24. 1 of 16 known versions is blocked or flagged. The newest version, 0.14.29, is flagged. See all versions.
AI Security Review
scanned 2d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe bundled local profile hard-codes an unofficial ngrok host, and the authenticated API client sends the stored bearer credential to whichever host that profile selects. Although production is the default, choosing the package’s local environment exposes the credential to the fixed tunnel operator.
Static reason
High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.; source matched previously finalized malicious package; routed for review
Trigger
A user runs the CLI with the local environment selected, or has local persisted as the environment.
Impact
The tunnel operator can receive and potentially misuse the user’s HookMyApp credential.
Mechanism
The API client reads the stored credential, sets it as the Authorization Bearer token, and sends the request to the effective API URL; the local profile hard-codes that URL to an ngrok tunnel.
Attack narrative
When the local environment is selected, the CLI sends authenticated API requests to a fixed ngrok tunnel instead of HookMyApp’s API. Its API client attaches the stored HookMyApp bearer credential to those requests, exposing the credential to whoever controls the tunnel. Production is the default, so this behavior requires selecting or persisting the local environment.
AI rationale
The bundled local profile hard-codes an unofficial ngrok host, and the authenticated API client sends the stored bearer credential to whichever host that profile selects. Although production is the default, choosing the package’s local environment exposes the credential to the fixed tunnel operator.
Evidence
dist/cli.js
Network endpoints1
uninked-robbi-boughless.ngrok-free.dev
Decision evidence
public snapshotAI called this Malicious at 96.0% confidence as Malware with low false-positive risk.
Evidence for block
- The bundled local environment hard-codes its API and app host to https://uninked-robbi-boughless.ngrok-free.dev.
- The API client reads the stored credential and uses it as a Bearer token in requests to the effective API URL.
- The executable imports dist/cli.js, making this request path reachable through the published CLI.
Evidence against
- The CLI defaults to the production environment; the ngrok host is used when the local environment is selected or persisted.
- The manifest has no install, preinstall, or postinstall hook; prepublishOnly runs a build and unit tests.
Behavioral surface
ChildProcessCryptoDynamicRequireEnvironmentVarsFilesystemNetwork
HighEntropyStringsPossibleObfuscationTelemetryUrlStrings
Source & flagged code
9 flaggeddist/cli.jsView file
48* Constructs the CommanderError class
L49: * @param {number} exitCode suggested exit code which could be used with process.exit
L50: * @param {string} code an id string representing the error
...
L1204: var EventEmitter = __require("node:events").EventEmitter;
L1205: var childProcess4 = __require("node:child_process");
L1206: var path3 = __require("node:path");
...
L1254: this._outputConfiguration = {
L1255: writeOut: (str) => process19.stdout.write(str),
L1256: writeErr: (str) => process19.stderr.write(str),
...
L1296: * @returns {Command[]}
L1297: * @private
L1298: */
Critical
Credential Exfiltration
Source appears to send environment or credential material to an external endpoint.
dist/cli.jsView on unpkg · L4848Trigger-reachable chain: manifest.bin -> bin/hookmyapp.js -> dist/cli.js
L48: * Constructs the CommanderError class
L49: * @param {number} exitCode suggested exit code which could be used with process.exit
L50: * @param {string} code an id string representing the error
...
L1204: var EventEmitter = __require("node:events").EventEmitter;
L1205: var childProcess4 = __require("node:child_process");
L1206: var path3 = __require("node:path");
...
L1254: this._outputConfiguration = {
L1255: writeOut: (str) => process19.stdout.write(str),
L1256: writeErr: (str) => process19.stderr.write(str),
...
L1296: * @returns {Command[]}
L1297: * @private
L1298: */
Critical
Trigger Reachable Dangerous Capability
A package entrypoint or install-time lifecycle script reaches a source file with blocking dangerous behavior.
dist/cli.jsFindings
2 Critical6 High4 Medium6 Low
CriticalCredential Exfiltrationdist/cli.js
CriticalTrigger Reachable Dangerous Capabilitydist/cli.js
HighChild Processdist/cli.js
HighCredential Redirect Persistencedist/cli.js
HighCommand Output Exfiltrationdist/cli.js
HighTrigger Reachable Credential Exfiltrationdist/cli.js
HighSemantic Analysis Limiteddist/cli.js
HighKnown Malware Source Similaritydist/cli.js
MediumDynamic Requiredist/cli.js
MediumNetwork
MediumEnvironment Vars
MediumStructural Risk Force Deep Review
LowNon Install Lifecycle Scripts
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @gethookmyapp/cli@0.14.24.
The versions list below shows the verdict for each recorded version.
- Avoid installing @gethookmyapp/cli@0.14.24. Remove it from direct dependencies and check your lockfile for transitive copies.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
- If this version ran, investigate the affected machine and build environment. Rotate credentials it could access and rebuild from a trusted environment.
Evidence last updated: .
Think this verdict is wrong? Dispute it on GitHub or read how reports are produced.