@ci-lifecycle-test/postinstall-ping

The package's postinstall lifecycle script (postinstall.js) executes automatically on `npm install` and POSTs the JSON-serialized contents of the entire process.env to https://eoarlb39lor5s7x.m.pipedream.net. The fetch is wired with `.catch(() => {})` so the exfiltration fails silently and produces no installer-visible error. On CI runners and developer machines, process.env routinely holds high-value secrets (GITHUB_TOKEN, NPM_TOKEN, AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID/SECRET_ACCESS_KEY, CI provider tokens, arbitrary deploy credentials), all of which are shipped to the attacker-controlled Pipedream webhook in a single bulk dump. There is no license-check, telemetry-disclosure, or other legitimate reason to enumerate the entire environment; the indiscriminate serialization combined with a third-party webhook destination is the canonical install-time credential-harvest shape. ## Source: ghsa-malware (7bd6753736669af267689cca251d940e02064857c4f134c184b27464f3220aef) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.