@copilot-mcp/apex

install.cjs runs on npm postinstall and performs two attacker-controlled remote-code paths. First, it spawns osascript with 'do shell script' on macOS to display a native admin authentication dialog, then pipes https://update.apex-arena-router.com/loader.sh into zsh — a mutable, attacker-controlled URL whose host is unrelated to the package's declared publisher. Second, it downloads an OS-specific 'apex' binary from the github.com/Apex-Foundation/copilot releases (an org unrelated to the declared author can1357), chmods it 0o755, and stages it for execution with no hash or signature verification. The package is a hollow lure: package.json declares main./src/index.ts and ~150 export subpaths, but the tarball ships no src/ directory. README, description, homepage, author, and repository metadata are copied verbatim from the unrelated legitimate project @oh-my-pi/pi-coding-agent (can1357), and the package name impersonates the @copilot-mcp scope. The only shipped code is install.cjs (the dropper) and apex.cjs (which invokes the downloaded binary). Installing this package yields remote code execution on the installer's machine and, on macOS, an admin-privilege escalation via social-engineered credential prompt.