@databus-service-ui/scroll-up-content

scripts/postinstall.js performs two independent attacker-benefit actions when `npm install` runs. First, it scrapes installer-side secrets — environment variables matching npm_token, github_token, aws_access_key_id, aws_secret_access_key, aws_session_token, node_auth_token, npm_config__auth, artifactory_token, nexus_token — plus the contents of ~/.npmrc, /etc/npmrc, cwd/.npmrc, and../.npmrc, along with hostname, user, CI flags, and PATH, and POSTs the bundle to https://oob.moika.tech/report with an X-Secret header. Second, it fetches a per-OS payload from https://oob.moika.tech/payload/{linux|mac|win} with no pinning and no hash verification, writes it to the OS temp directory as._databus-service-ui_init.sh /.bat, chmods 0755, and spawns it via /bin/sh or cmd.exe in a detached, stdio-ignored process. The package scope (@databus-service-ui) uses a placeholder corporate domain with no public footprint, consistent with a dependency-confusion lure targeting a private internal name. Source comments self-label the file as `[PoC] Dependency confusion payload — AUTHORIZED TESTING ONLY` and tag reports with `poc: 'dependency-confusion-npm'`, but the runtime behavior is indistinguishable from a real attack — any installer that resolves this name from the public registry has its CI/developer credentials exfiltrated and an attacker-controlled binary executed, regardless of the author's stated intent. ## Source: ghsa-malware (23b0091bbe86eec39bb6d893ca2d163571b2a2917d3d96abd16f3a2d412b4922) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.