OpenSSF/OSV advisory MAL-2026-4347 confirms this npm version as malicious. A campaign of npm packages sharing a common dropper (`clob.js`) that downloads and persistently installs a Windows executable from IPFS on `postinstall`. The dropper fetches the binary from IPFS CID `bafybeif3zkapj364ofnrvbty7oj5h5ufpxlp4s62usk3ulxrru35e3gssa` via multiple public gateways (Pinata, Cloudflare, ipfs.io), drops it to `%LOCALAPPDATA%`, registers Windows Registry persistence under...
Source
OpenSSF Malicious Packages via OSV
Summary
Malicious code in @devcarron/clob (npm)
Details
A campaign of npm packages sharing a common dropper (`clob.js`) that downloads and persistently installs a Windows executable from IPFS on `postinstall`. The dropper fetches the binary from IPFS CID `bafybeif3zkapj364ofnrvbty7oj5h5ufpxlp4s62usk3ulxrru35e3gssa` via multiple public gateways (Pinata, Cloudflare, ipfs.io), drops it to `%LOCALAPPDATA%`, registers Windows Registry persistence under `HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run` using a hidden VBScript wrapper (window style 0, no taskbar entry), launches the payload immediately, and reports the victim's public IP address to a hardcoded C2 server via HTTP POST. macOS and Linux stubs are present but not yet configured. Developer artifacts bundled in `config/meta_data.json` leak the attacker's build path: `E:\getting IP and check list\clob-downloader\`.
`@devcarron/clob` is a scoped package identical in behavior to `clob.api` and likely published by the same actor as a distribution variant. It bundles `clob2.0.exe` (≈4 MB) directly in the tarball and also fetches from IPFS. Its `postinstall` script runs `clob.js`, which drops the executable to `%LOCALAPPDATA%\clob2.0.exe`. The C2 beacon transmits the victim's public IP to `http://45.8.22.112:2026/api/urls`.
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## Source: amazon-inspector (7a672e1412ca3d2af83bcf7772d7cf6b1803b8987a43e4a2abc359112f34aea1) @devcarron/clob ships a malicious postinstall dropper. package.json declares `postinstall: node clob.js`, which on `npm install` downloads an opaque Windows executable (clob2.0.exe) from IPFS via gateways including violet-tricky-quelea-562.mypinata.cloud, cloudflare-ipfs.com, and gateway.pinata.cloud (CID bafybeif3zkapj364ofnrvbty7oj5h5ufpxlp4s62usk3ulxrru35e3gssa), writes it under %LOCALAPPDATA%, generates a VBS launcher, and registers HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run to silently launch the binary via wscript.exe with windowsHide. Equivalent persistence is installed on macOS via ~/Library/LaunchAgents/com.clob.agent.plist + launchctl load, and on Linux via ~/.config/autostart/clob.desktop. clob.js then resolves the installer's public IP through api.ipify.org and POSTs it to the hardcoded bare-IP endpoint http://45.8.22.112:2026/api/urls over plain HTTP — an install-time beacon notifying the operator of each successful infection. The tarball additionally ships a 4 MB Windows PE clob2.0.exe at the root, and README.md is copied verbatim from @img/sharp-win32-x64 (`Prebuilt sharp for use with Windows x64`) to disguise the package's true purpose. None of these behaviors relate to any legitimate library function: no source code, no advertised API, no relation to libvips/sharp.