@djessicatony/folk-mcp-canary

index.js contains a beacon-style exfiltration primitive: a fetch() POST at line 60-61 sends process.env data (read at lines 30 and 34) to a hardcoded destination URL (https://REPLACE-WITH-YOUR-BEACON.example, observed at line 24). The file also references 'ping' command invocations (lines 3, 83, 92) consistent with host reconnaissance. The destination URL is a placeholder template string ('REPLACE-WITH-YOUR-BEACON.example'), indicating this is either a published-by-mistake attack template or a proof-of-concept beacon stub — either way the structural shape (env-var read + POST to hardcoded non-publisher endpoint) is an installer-data exfiltration pattern with no legitimate purpose. Package name (under @djessicatony scope, suffix 'canary', version 0.0.1) and the placeholder C2 are consistent with throwaway test-publish of malicious tooling.