registry / Remote code execution / @equansservices/tool
@equansservices/tool
EquansService Claude package
This report shows the evidence for @equansservices/tool@1.0.2. 1 of 2 known versions is blocked or flagged. See all versions.
AI Security Review
scanned 4mo ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThis is concrete malicious install-hook behavior: unconsented postinstall download and detached execution of remote unauthenticated code. The behavior is not package-aligned with a benign library and prevents meaningful npm source review of the executed payload.
Static reason
One or more suspicious static signals were detected.
Trigger
npm install postinstall lifecycle
Impact
Remote code execution during package installation with the installing user's privileges.
Mechanism
remote download, extraction, and detached execution
Attack narrative
On npm install, package.json runs setup.js. setup.js selects a platform URL, downloads a ZIP-like artifact from CloudFront over HTTP, extracts it under a temporary internal-setup directory, deletes the archive, and launches extracted code detached in the background: aws.exe on Windows or upgrade.py via python3 on Linux. The payload is remote and unauthenticated, making the package an install-time remote code execution loader.
AI rationale
This is concrete malicious install-hook behavior: unconsented postinstall download and detached execution of remote unauthenticated code. The behavior is not package-aligned with a benign library and prevents meaningful npm source review of the executed payload.
Evidence
package.jsonsetup.jsos.tmpdir()/internal-setup-*/setup.zipos.tmpdir()/internal-setup-*/app
Network endpoints2
d2vf4rs175cy2k.cloudfront.net/install/v1/plugin.zipd2vf4rs175cy2k.cloudfront.net/install/v1/marketplace
Decision evidence
public snapshotAI called this Malicious at 97.0% confidence as Malware with low false-positive risk.
Evidence for block
- package.json defines postinstall: node setup.js, so behavior runs during npm install.
- setup.js downloads platform-specific archives from http://d2vf4rs175cy2k.cloudfront.net/install/v1/plugin.zip or /marketplace.
- Downloaded content is extracted to an os.tmpdir() internal-setup-* directory and then executed.
- Windows launch runs extracted aws.exe detached; Linux launch runs python3 upgrade.py detached.
- Uses plain HTTP, redirects allowed, no integrity or signature verification before execution.
Evidence against
- No credential harvesting or direct exfiltration code is present in the inspected package source.
- No persistence logic is visible in the package source itself beyond detached execution of the downloaded payload.
Behavioral surface
ChildProcessFilesystemNetwork
HighEntropyStringsUrlStrings
NoLicenseWildcardDependency
Source & flagged code
1 flagged · loading sourcepackage.jsonView file
•scripts.postinstall = node setup.js
High
Install Time Lifecycle Scripts
Package defines install-time lifecycle scripts.
package.jsonView on unpkgFindings
1 High3 Medium5 Low
HighInstall Time Lifecycle Scriptspackage.json
MediumNetwork
MediumStructural Risk Force Deep Review
MediumWildcard Dependency
LowScripts Present
LowFilesystem
LowHigh Entropy Strings
LowUrl Strings
LowNo License
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @equansservices/tool@1.0.2.
The versions list below shows the verdict for each recorded version.
- Avoid installing @equansservices/tool@1.0.2. Remove it from direct dependencies and check your lockfile for transitive copies.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
- If this version ran, investigate the affected machine and build environment. Rotate credentials it could access and rebuild from a trusted environment.
Evidence last updated: .
Source advisory published: .
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