@gethookmyapp/cli@0.14.10
HookMyApp CLI, No BS. Just go live.
AI Security Review
scanned 3mo ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe scanner's broad exfiltration claim is not supported: command execution is primarily CLI tooling and credential-bearing API calls are service-auth flows. However, automatic user-scope Claude MCP registration after login is a concrete, consent-sensitive agent control-surface mutation that warrants warning.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- dist/cli.js: successful login calls maybeInstallClaudeMcp()
- dist/cli.js: invokes `claude mcp add-json --scope user`
- MCP config points to HookMyApp API and a token-producing headers helper
- package.json has no install/preinstall/postinstall hook
- bin/hookmyapp.js only imports the CLI entrypoint
- credential reads/writes are confined to ~/.config/hookmyapp
- API token use is for documented HookMyApp authentication
- cloudflared download is user-commanded and SHA-256 verified
Source & flagged code
7 flaggedSource appears to send environment or credential material to an external endpoint.
dist/cli.jsView on unpkg · L48Source executes local commands and sends command output to an external endpoint.
dist/cli.jsView on unpkg · L48Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @gethookmyapp/cli@0.14.10.
See all versions of @gethookmyapp/cli for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @gethookmyapp/cli@0.14.10 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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