@gethookmyapp/cli@0.14.20
HookMyApp CLI, No BS. Just go live.
AI Security Review
scanned 2d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe source shows disclosed, opt-out runtime telemetry that can attach account email and user ID to analytics. Under the review rules, identifying details make this suspicious even when disclosed; I found no evidence supporting the scanner’s credential-exfiltration claim.
Static reason
High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.; source matched previously finalized malicious package; routed for review
Trigger
CLI usage triggers analytics; a crash triggers Sentry reporting, and login triggers PostHog user identification.
Impact
The analytics providers can associate usage or crash data with a specific account, creating a privacy risk despite disclosure and an opt-out.
Mechanism
The CLI reads its saved HookMyApp credentials, extracts account identity, and attaches it to crash reports sent to Sentry; login identification sends available email and name to PostHog.
AI rationale
The source shows disclosed, opt-out runtime telemetry that can attach account email and user ID to analytics. Under the review rules, identifying details make this suspicious even when disclosed; I found no evidence supporting the scanner’s credential-exfiltration claim.
Evidence
dist/cli.js
Network endpoints2
us.i.posthog.como4511121201627136.ingest.de.sentry.io
Decision evidence
public snapshotAI called this Suspicious at 88.0% confidence as Dangerous Capability with medium false-positive risk.
Evidence for warning
- The CLI reports crash and usage analytics by default; its disclosure says signed-in account email and user ID accompany crash reports and provides an opt-out.
- On login, the CLI identifies the user to PostHog and includes their email when available.
- Crash reporting attaches the saved account email and user ID before sending exceptions to Sentry.
Evidence against
- Telemetry is disclosed, can be disabled with a CLI setting or environment variable, and says it does not send command arguments, file contents, or environment variable values.
- PostHog and Sentry are configured analytics endpoints; the reviewed code did not show unrelated credential forwarding.
- The manifest has no install, preinstall, or postinstall hook; prepublishOnly runs a build and unit tests.
- The CLI sends its own login credentials to its configured HookMyApp/WorkOS services for authentication.
Behavioral surface
ChildProcessCryptoDynamicRequireEnvironmentVarsFilesystem
Source & flagged code
9 flaggeddist/cli.jsView file
48* Constructs the CommanderError class
L49: * @param {number} exitCode suggested exit code which could be used with process.exit
L50: * @param {string} code an id string representing the error
...
L1204: var EventEmitter = __require("node:events").EventEmitter;
L1205: var childProcess4 = __require("node:child_process");
L1206: var path3 = __require("node:path");
...
L1254: this._outputConfiguration = {
L1255: writeOut: (str) => process19.stdout.write(str),
L1256: writeErr: (str) => process19.stderr.write(str),
...
L1296: * @returns {Command[]}
L1297: * @private
L1298: */
Critical
Credential Exfiltration
Source appears to send environment or credential material to an external endpoint.
dist/cli.jsView on unpkg · L4848Trigger-reachable chain: manifest.bin -> bin/hookmyapp.js -> dist/cli.js
L48: * Constructs the CommanderError class
L49: * @param {number} exitCode suggested exit code which could be used with process.exit
L50: * @param {string} code an id string representing the error
...
L1204: var EventEmitter = __require("node:events").EventEmitter;
L1205: var childProcess4 = __require("node:child_process");
L1206: var path3 = __require("node:path");
...
L1254: this._outputConfiguration = {
L1255: writeOut: (str) => process19.stdout.write(str),
L1256: writeErr: (str) => process19.stderr.write(str),
...
L1296: * @returns {Command[]}
L1297: * @private
L1298: */
Critical
Trigger Reachable Dangerous Capability
A package entrypoint or install-time lifecycle script reaches a source file with blocking dangerous behavior.
dist/cli.jsFindings
2 Critical6 High4 Medium6 Low
CriticalCredential Exfiltrationdist/cli.js
CriticalTrigger Reachable Dangerous Capabilitydist/cli.js
HighChild Processdist/cli.js
HighCredential Redirect Persistencedist/cli.js
HighCommand Output Exfiltrationdist/cli.js
HighTrigger Reachable Credential Exfiltrationdist/cli.js
HighSemantic Analysis Limiteddist/cli.js
HighKnown Malware Source Similaritydist/cli.js
MediumDynamic Requiredist/cli.js
MediumNetwork
MediumEnvironment Vars
MediumStructural Risk Force Deep Review
LowNon Install Lifecycle Scripts
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @gethookmyapp/cli@0.14.20.
See all versions of @gethookmyapp/cli for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @gethookmyapp/cli@0.14.20 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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