registry / @gethookmyapp/cli / 0.14.22
@gethookmyapp/cli@0.14.22
HookMyApp CLI, No BS. Just go live.
AI Security Review
scanned 2d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe CLI’s MCP credential flow targets its configured HookMyApp API, and no forwarding of unrelated credentials or other concrete attack behavior was found. The package has no install hook; its telemetry is disclosed with a disable setting.
Static reason
High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.; source matched previously finalized malicious package; routed for review
Trigger
CLI commands; agent setup can also run after login.
Impact
Routine service authentication and agent configuration; telemetry can be disabled.
Mechanism
The reviewed flow uses HookMyApp credentials with the configured HookMyApp MCP endpoint. Agent configuration and skills are part of the CLI’s setup behavior.
AI rationale
The CLI’s MCP credential flow targets its configured HookMyApp API, and no forwarding of unrelated credentials or other concrete attack behavior was found. The package has no install hook; its telemetry is disclosed with a disable setting.
Evidence
~/.codex/config.toml~/.cursor/mcp.json~/.config/hookmyapp/credentials.json~/.config/hookmyapp/mcp-credential.json
Network endpoints2
api.hookmyapp.comus.i.posthog.com
Decision evidence
public snapshotAI called this Clean at 90.0% confidence as Benign with low false-positive risk.
Evidence for AI clean decision
- The manifest has no install hook; prepublishOnly only builds and runs unit tests.
- The MCP URL is derived from the configured HookMyApp API URL and uses its /mcp endpoint.
- MCP authentication reads the package’s saved credentials for the HookMyApp agent service; Codex setup configures that MCP endpoint.
- Telemetry is disclosed, says command arguments and file contents are not sent, and offers a disable setting.
Evidence against
- The scanner flags credential redirection and exfiltration, but the reviewed credential flow configures the package’s own MCP service; no unrelated credential forwarding was identified.
- The CLI can write agent configuration and install HookMyApp skills, but this is part of its agent setup flow.
Behavioral surface
ChildProcessCryptoEnvironmentVarsFilesystemNetworkShell
HighEntropyStringsUrlStrings
Source & flagged code
9 flaggeddist/cli.jsView file
48* Constructs the CommanderError class
L49: * @param {number} exitCode suggested exit code which could be used with process.exit
L50: * @param {string} code an id string representing the error
...
L1204: var EventEmitter = __require("node:events").EventEmitter;
L1205: var childProcess4 = __require("node:child_process");
L1206: var path3 = __require("node:path");
...
L1254: this._outputConfiguration = {
L1255: writeOut: (str) => process19.stdout.write(str),
L1256: writeErr: (str) => process19.stderr.write(str),
...
L1296: * @returns {Command[]}
L1297: * @private
L1298: */
Critical
Credential Exfiltration
Source appears to send environment or credential material to an external endpoint.
dist/cli.jsView on unpkg · L4848Trigger-reachable chain: manifest.bin -> bin/hookmyapp.js -> dist/cli.js
L48: * Constructs the CommanderError class
L49: * @param {number} exitCode suggested exit code which could be used with process.exit
L50: * @param {string} code an id string representing the error
...
L1204: var EventEmitter = __require("node:events").EventEmitter;
L1205: var childProcess4 = __require("node:child_process");
L1206: var path3 = __require("node:path");
...
L1254: this._outputConfiguration = {
L1255: writeOut: (str) => process19.stdout.write(str),
L1256: writeErr: (str) => process19.stderr.write(str),
...
L1296: * @returns {Command[]}
L1297: * @private
L1298: */
Critical
Trigger Reachable Dangerous Capability
A package entrypoint or install-time lifecycle script reaches a source file with blocking dangerous behavior.
dist/cli.jsFindings
2 Critical7 High3 Medium5 Low
CriticalCredential Exfiltrationdist/cli.js
CriticalTrigger Reachable Dangerous Capabilitydist/cli.js
HighChild Processdist/cli.js
HighShelldist/cli.js
HighCredential Redirect Persistencedist/cli.js
HighCommand Output Exfiltrationdist/cli.js
HighTrigger Reachable Credential Exfiltrationdist/cli.js
HighSemantic Analysis Limiteddist/cli.js
HighKnown Malware Source Similaritydist/cli.js
MediumNetwork
MediumEnvironment Vars
MediumStructural Risk Force Deep Review
LowNon Install Lifecycle Scripts
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @gethookmyapp/cli@0.14.22.
See all versions of @gethookmyapp/cli for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @gethookmyapp/cli@0.14.22 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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