@gethookmyapp/cli@0.14.5
HookMyApp CLI, No BS. Just go live.
AI Security Review
scanned 3mo ago · by lpm-firewall-aiNo install-time execution, credential harvesting, command-output exfiltration, or remote payload chain was confirmed. The automatic post-login user-scope MCP registration warrants a warning under the extension lifecycle policy.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- dist/cli.js auto-installs a user-scope Claude MCP entry after successful login when `claude` is present.
- The entry points to the HookMyApp MCP endpoint and uses a helper that prints the current bearer token.
- package.json has no install lifecycle hook; only prepublishOnly is declared.
- The MCP setup is first-party, named `hookmyapp`, and also available as an explicit `mcp install --agent claude` command.
- Child-process use is bounded to Claude MCP management and `doctor` version checks; no shell payload execution found.
Source & flagged code
6 flaggedSource appears to send environment or credential material to an external endpoint.
dist/cli.jsView on unpkg · L48Source executes local commands and sends command output to an external endpoint.
dist/cli.jsView on unpkg · L48Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @gethookmyapp/cli@0.14.5.
See all versions of @gethookmyapp/cli for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @gethookmyapp/cli@0.14.5 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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