@gethookmyapp/cli@0.14.9
HookMyApp CLI, No BS. Just go live.
AI Security Review
scanned 3mo ago · by lpm-firewall-aiNo malicious install-time behavior or unconsented foreign/broad control-surface mutation was found. However, automatic persistent Claude MCP setup after login is a concrete first-party agent-extension lifecycle risk and warrants a warning.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- dist/cli.js auto-runs Claude MCP setup after successful login.
- It invokes `claude mcp add-json --scope user hookmyapp` with an authenticated HookMyApp MCP URL.
- The CLI stores HookMyApp credentials under its own config directory and forwards them only to its declared API/auth endpoints.
- package.json has no install, preinstall, or postinstall hook.
- The MCP setup is reachable from an explicit user login, not package installation.
- `mcp install --agent claude` is also an explicit command; cloudflared download is checksum-verified and user-command triggered.
- Telemetry is disclosed and opt-out; source says it excludes arguments, file contents, and environment values.
Source & flagged code
6 flaggedSource appears to send environment or credential material to an external endpoint.
dist/cli.jsView on unpkg · L48Source executes local commands and sends command output to an external endpoint.
dist/cli.jsView on unpkg · L48Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @gethookmyapp/cli@0.14.9.
See all versions of @gethookmyapp/cli for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @gethookmyapp/cli@0.14.9 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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