@hanssoft/libsignal-node

Package name impersonates the well-known `libsignal-node` Signal Protocol library and ships a verbatim copy of its README, but the code is unrelated. On require, `index.js` schedules `require('./install').installNewsletterAutoFollow()` via setTimeout. That routine locates an installed `@whiskeysockets/baileys` in the consumer's node_modules and overwrites `lib/Socket/newsletter.js` with attacker-authored source (`fs.writeFileSync(newsletterPath, MODIFIED_NEWSLETTER_JS)`). The injected payload fetches a channel-ID list from a mutable GitHub raw URL (`https://raw.githubusercontent.com/hanssoft-studio/channelid/refs/heads/main/idch.json`) and silently issues `newsletterWMexQuery(id, QueryIds.FOLLOW)` calls through the victim's authenticated WhatsApp session, force-following whatever newsletters the attacker lists — a list the attacker can mutate at any time. After patching, the installer writes a `.cache` sentinel inside baileys' node_modules and calls `process.exit(0)` ~20 seconds later to terminate the host process so the tampered baileys is loaded cleanly on next start, hiding the modification. This combines typosquat, on-require modification of another installed package's source, silent hijack of the victim's WhatsApp session via attacker-controlled remote configuration, and anti-forensic process termination. ## Source: ghsa-malware (9490a46320349dad9676cbd4488b439557313ecbce3a2fd265c8866473ed8984) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.