@hashbrownai/ollama@0.8.2
Ollama provider for Hashbrown AI
AI Security Review
scanned 6d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe default postinstall hook sends Git identity and checkout context to the vendor’s endpoint without explicit consent. Since the event includes personal and project details from the user’s machine, this is data exfiltration.
Static reason
One or more suspicious static signals were detected.; source matched previously finalized malicious package; routed for review
Trigger
Package installation runs the postinstall lifecycle hook by default.
Impact
Git identity and project context are disclosed during installation without an explicit opt-in.
Mechanism
The collector reads Git configuration, adds the configured display name and email to the install event, then sends the batch to hashbrown.dev.
Attack narrative
During package installation, the postinstall hook collects install context and sends an event to hashbrown.dev. For non-CI installs, the event can include the configured Git display name and email, along with repository provider and owner derived from the consuming checkout. This transmits personal and project details without an explicit opt-in.
AI rationale
The default postinstall hook sends Git identity and checkout context to the vendor’s endpoint without explicit consent. Since the event includes personal and project details from the user’s machine, this is data exfiltration.
Evidence
package.jsoninstall/postinstall.cjsinstall/collector.cjsinstall/policy.cjsinstall/git-context.cjs~/.hashbrown/installation-id<packageRoot>/development-install.mjs<packageRoot>/development-install.cjs
Network endpoints1
hashbrown.dev
Decision evidence
public snapshotAI called this Malicious at 98.0% confidence as Malware with low false-positive risk.
Evidence for block
- The package runs install/postinstall.cjs automatically from its postinstall lifecycle script.
- The postinstall handler calls collectInstall during npm postinstall.
- The default endpoint is https://hashbrown.dev/_/growth/collect/v1/install; only loopback endpoint overrides are accepted.
- The collector adds identity data to the install event and sends the batch to the selected endpoint.
- Git discovery reads configured Git name and email and includes them as gitDisplayName and gitEmail in identity.
Evidence against
- The event also contains ordinary package installation telemetry such as package version, OS family, architecture, Node version, and package-manager details.
- The collector supports telemetry opt-out environment variables.
Behavioral surface
CryptoEnvironmentVarsFilesystemNetwork
UrlStrings
Source & flagged code
7 flaggedpackage.jsonView file
•scripts.postinstall = node install/postinstall.cjs
High
Install Time Lifecycle Scripts
Package defines install-time lifecycle scripts.
package.jsonView on unpkg36"scripts": {
"postinstall": "node install/postinstall.cjs"
}
}
High
Suspicious Lifecycle Evidence
The package runs install/postinstall.cjs automatically from its postinstall lifecycle script.
package.jsonView on unpkg · L36•scripts.postinstall = node install/postinstall.cjs
Medium
Ambiguous Install Lifecycle Script
Install-time lifecycle script is not statically allowlisted and needs review.
package.jsonView on unpkginstall/git-context.cjsView file
Findings
6 High3 Medium3 Low
HighInstall Time Lifecycle Scriptspackage.json
HighKnown Malware Source Similarityinstall/git-context.cjs
HighKnown Malware Source Similarityinstall/policy.cjs
HighSuspicious Lifecycle Evidencepackage.json
HighSuspicious Lifecycle Evidenceinstall/postinstall.cjs
HighAi Review Evidenceinstall/policy.cjs
MediumAmbiguous Install Lifecycle Scriptpackage.json
MediumNetwork
MediumEnvironment Vars
LowScripts Present
LowFilesystem
LowUrl Strings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @hashbrownai/ollama@0.8.2.
See all versions of @hashbrownai/ollama for other recorded verdicts.
- Avoid installing @hashbrownai/ollama@0.8.2. Remove it from direct dependencies and check your lockfile for transitive copies.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
- If this version ran, investigate the affected machine and build environment. Rotate credentials it could access and rebuild from a trusted environment.
Evidence last updated: .
Think this verdict is wrong? Dispute it on GitHub or read how reports are produced.