registry / Data exfiltration / @hashbrownai/ollama
@hashbrownai/ollama
Ollama provider for Hashbrown AI
This report shows the evidence for @hashbrownai/ollama@0.8.3. 2 of 8 known versions are blocked or flagged. See all versions.
AI Security Review
scanned 6d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe automatic postinstall hook sends configured Git display names and email addresses to the package vendor’s collection endpoint without explicit consent. Because this collects personal details from the user's machine during installation, classify it as data exfiltration.
Static reason
One or more suspicious static signals were detected.; source matched previously finalized malicious package; routed for review
Trigger
Automatic package installation when the postinstall lifecycle runs.
Impact
Exposes personal identity details to the package vendor without the installer's explicit consent.
Mechanism
Reads Git configuration, attaches the configured display name and email to the event outside CI, and posts it to the default collection endpoint. Opt-out environment variables are available, but consent is not requested.
Attack narrative
During installation, the postinstall hook gathers Git identity information and, outside CI, includes the configured display name and email in an install event sent to hashbrown.dev. The hook runs automatically without an explicit consent prompt; opt-out variables do not change the default collection behavior.
AI rationale
The automatic postinstall hook sends configured Git display names and email addresses to the package vendor’s collection endpoint without explicit consent. Because this collects personal details from the user's machine during installation, classify it as data exfiltration.
Evidence
package.jsoninstall/postinstall.cjsinstall/collector.cjsinstall/git-context.cjsinstall/policy.cjsinstall/identity.cjs~/.hashbrown/installation-id~/.config/git/config~/.gitconfig<consumer checkout>/.git/config<consumer checkout>/.git/config.worktree
Network endpoints1
hashbrown.dev/_/growth/collect/v1/install
Decision evidence
public snapshotAI called this Malicious at 97.0% confidence as Malware with low false-positive risk.
Evidence for block
- The package runs a postinstall hook automatically.
- The install collector reads Git identity data, including the configured display name and email.
- Outside CI, the collector attaches that identity to the install event and sends the batch.
- The batch is sent to the package vendor’s install collection endpoint without an explicit consent prompt.
Evidence against
- The collector honors several telemetry opt-out environment variables.
- The runtime entry point exports the Ollama adapter; the flagged collection is in the install hook.
Behavioral surface
CryptoEnvironmentVarsFilesystemNetwork
UrlStrings
Source & flagged code
7 flaggedpackage.jsonView file
•scripts.postinstall = node install/postinstall.cjs
High
Install Time Lifecycle Scripts
Package defines install-time lifecycle scripts.
package.jsonView on unpkg36"scripts": {
"postinstall": "node install/postinstall.cjs"
}
}
High
Suspicious Lifecycle Evidence
The package runs a postinstall hook automatically.
package.jsonView on unpkg · L36•scripts.postinstall = node install/postinstall.cjs
Medium
Ambiguous Install Lifecycle Script
Install-time lifecycle script is not statically allowlisted and needs review.
package.jsonView on unpkginstall/git-context.cjsView file
Findings
6 High3 Medium3 Low
HighInstall Time Lifecycle Scriptspackage.json
HighKnown Malware Source Similarityinstall/git-context.cjs
HighKnown Malware Source Similarityinstall/policy.cjs
HighSuspicious Lifecycle Evidencepackage.json
HighSuspicious Lifecycle Evidenceinstall/postinstall.cjs
HighAi Review Evidenceinstall/git-context.cjs
MediumAmbiguous Install Lifecycle Scriptpackage.json
MediumNetwork
MediumEnvironment Vars
LowScripts Present
LowFilesystem
LowUrl Strings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @hashbrownai/ollama@0.8.3.
The versions list below shows the verdict for each recorded version.
- Avoid installing @hashbrownai/ollama@0.8.3. Remove it from direct dependencies and check your lockfile for transitive copies.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
- If this version ran, investigate the affected machine and build environment. Rotate credentials it could access and rebuild from a trusted environment.
Evidence last updated: .
Think this verdict is wrong? Dispute it on GitHub or read how reports are produced.