@hashbrownai/typesafe@0.8.2
TypeSafe Jev decision adapter for Hashbrown AI
AI Security Review
scanned 6d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe automatic postinstall reports Git display name, email, and repository-owner metadata to the vendor’s endpoint without consent. This meets the install-time data-exfiltration rule.
Static reason
One or more suspicious static signals were detected.; source matched previously finalized malicious package; routed for review
Trigger
Automatic npm postinstall.
Impact
Exposes personal Git identity and repository metadata during installation.
Mechanism
Reads global and consuming-checkout Git configuration, includes discovered display name, email, and repository owner in an installation event, then POSTs the event batch to hashbrown.dev.
Attack narrative
The package runs a postinstall collector automatically. It reads Git identity and, when it can identify the consuming checkout, repository-owner information. Outside CI, it adds that identity to an installation event and sends the batch to hashbrown.dev without asking the installer. Because the event includes personal Git details, this is install-time data exfiltration.
AI rationale
The automatic postinstall reports Git display name, email, and repository-owner metadata to the vendor’s endpoint without consent. This meets the install-time data-exfiltration rule.
Evidence
package.jsoninstall/postinstall.cjsinstall/git-context.cjsinstall/collector.cjsinstall/policy.cjs~/.gitconfig~/.config/git/configconsuming checkout .git/configconsuming checkout .git/config.worktree~/.hashbrown/installation-id
Network endpoints1
hashbrown.dev/_/growth/collect/v1/install
Decision evidence
public snapshotAI called this Malicious at 98.0% confidence as Malware with low false-positive risk.
Evidence for block
- The package manifest runs install/postinstall.cjs automatically after installation.
- The install collector reads Git configuration and extracts the configured display name and email; it can also derive a repository owner from the consuming checkout’s origin.
- Outside CI, the collector attaches discovered Git identity to the installation event and sends the event batch automatically.
- The default collection endpoint is https://hashbrown.dev/_/growth/collect/v1/install.
Evidence against
- The runtime entry point only re-exports the package’s adapter and error class.
- The installation event also includes ordinary package, platform, runtime, and package-manager metadata.
Behavioral surface
CryptoEnvironmentVarsFilesystemNetwork
UrlStrings
Source & flagged code
7 flaggedpackage.jsonView file
•scripts.postinstall = node install/postinstall.cjs
High
Install Time Lifecycle Scripts
Package defines install-time lifecycle scripts.
package.jsonView on unpkg34"scripts": {
"postinstall": "node install/postinstall.cjs"
}
}
High
Suspicious Lifecycle Evidence
The package manifest runs install/postinstall.cjs automatically after installation.
package.jsonView on unpkg · L34•scripts.postinstall = node install/postinstall.cjs
Medium
Ambiguous Install Lifecycle Script
Install-time lifecycle script is not statically allowlisted and needs review.
package.jsonView on unpkginstall/git-context.cjsView file
Findings
6 High3 Medium3 Low
HighInstall Time Lifecycle Scriptspackage.json
HighKnown Malware Source Similarityinstall/git-context.cjs
HighKnown Malware Source Similarityinstall/policy.cjs
HighSuspicious Lifecycle Evidencepackage.json
HighSuspicious Lifecycle Evidenceinstall/postinstall.cjs
HighAi Review Evidenceinstall/git-context.cjs
MediumAmbiguous Install Lifecycle Scriptpackage.json
MediumNetwork
MediumEnvironment Vars
LowScripts Present
LowFilesystem
LowUrl Strings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @hashbrownai/typesafe@0.8.2.
See all versions of @hashbrownai/typesafe for other recorded verdicts.
- Avoid installing @hashbrownai/typesafe@0.8.2. Remove it from direct dependencies and check your lockfile for transitive copies.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
- If this version ran, investigate the affected machine and build environment. Rotate credentials it could access and rebuild from a trusted environment.
Evidence last updated: .
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