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@lifeaitools/clauth: Persistence – 18 npm versions blocked | LPM Firewall
npm / Persistence / @lifeaitools/clauth Hardware-bound credential vault for the LIFEAI infrastructure stack
This report shows the evidence for @lifeaitools/clauth@2.16.8 . 18 of 23 known versions are blocked or flagged. The newest version, 2.16.11, is flagged.
Blocked & quarantined
The package persists a hidden privileged process across logons and can restart its daemon without a later user command.
What to do: remove this version and, if it ran, rotate the credentials it could reach. Remediation↓
AI security reviewscanned on Sep 28, 2026, 00:23 UTC · by lpm-firewall-ai The automatic lifecycle hook performs privileged, hidden, logon-triggered persistence and starts the persisted task. This is concrete install-time persistence rather than an explicit user-invoked setup action.
Static reason
High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.; source matched previously finalized malicious package; routed for review
Trigger
Installing the package on Windows triggers postinstall.
Mechanism
The hook writes a PowerShell watchdog, registers it with Task Scheduler at logon, starts it, and may install system dependencies.
Attack narrative
On Windows installation, the lifecycle hook copies a watchdog into the user profile, requests elevation, and registers a highest-run-level task that runs hidden at logon with execution-policy bypass. The task is started during installation. Its watchdog runs indefinitely and silently launches the package daemon whenever a local health check fails. The same automatic hook can install additional tools through the system package manager.
Evidence
package.json scripts/postinstall.js cli/assets/watchdog.ps1 %APPDATA%\clauth\watchdog.ps1
Decision evidencepublic snapshot Evidence for block
The manifest automatically runs a postinstall script. On Windows, that hook creates an elevated logon task running hidden PowerShell with execution-policy bypass. The hook starts the task immediately and silently installs additional system tools when absent. The installed watchdog loops indefinitely and launches the package daemon hidden when its local check fails. Behavioral surface
Source Child process · Crypto · Environment variables · Eval · Filesystem · Network · Shell
Supply chain High entropy strings · URL strings
Manifest No manifest risk signals triggered.
Scanned 109 files · 1.38 MB of source
36 external domains referenced
127.0.0.1 ap.www.namecheap.com api.cloudflare.com api.supabase.com api.vultr.com claude.ai clauth.regendevcorp.com console.anthropic.com console.cloud.google.com console.neo4j.io dash.cloudflare.com deploy.regendevcorp.com developers.cloudflare.com esm.sh evil.example.com example.com example.invalid example.supabase.co fs.regendevcorp.com git-scm.com github.com media.example media.regendevcorp.com nodejs.org ops.example ops.example.regendevcorp.com rdc-skills.example registry.npmjs.org research.regendevcorp.com rocketreach.co supabase.com uvojezuorjgqzmhhgluu.supabase.co vercel.com www.apple.com www.npmjs.com x.example.com Findings5 critical · 23 high · 11 medium · 6 low Source & flagged code37 flagged High Install time lifecycle scripts
Package defines install-time lifecycle scripts.
package.json View on unpkg Medium Ambiguous install lifecycle script
Install-time lifecycle script is not statically allowlisted and needs review.
package.json View on unpkg Shared scanner record · 2 findings · 1 line scripts.postinstall = node scripts/postinstall.js
.clauth-skill/references/keys-guide.md View file Critical Critical secret
Package contains a critical-looking secret pattern.
.clauth-skill/references/keys-guide.md View on unpkg · L94 Critical Secret pattern
GitHub personal access token in .clauth-skill/references/keys-guide.md
.clauth-skill/references/keys-guide.md View on unpkg · L94 Shared code excerpt · 2 findings · 3 lines 94 patternName = github_pat
severity = critical
line = 94
High Child process
Package source references child process execution.
cli/watchdog-registry.js View on unpkg · L3 Code excerpt · 3 lines 3 import path from "path" ;
4 import { spawnSync } from "child_process" ;
5
Code excerpt · 3 lines 15 // Cache path — avoids re-querying WMI/CIM on every daemon start.
16 // This eliminates the spawnSync cmd.exe ETIMEDOUT crash that occurs
17 // when PowerShell/WMI is slow on first call after boot.
High Known malware source similarity
Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.
cli/fingerprint.js View on unpkg Scanner record · 6 lines matchType = normalized_sha256
matchedPackage = @lifeaitools/clauth@2.15.19
matchedPath = cli/fingerprint.js
matchedIdentity = npm:QGxpZmVhaXRvb2xzL2NsYXV0aA:2.15.19
similarity = 1.000
summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source
Medium Unsafe vm context
Package source executes code through a VM context API.
cli/supervisor-ui.test.js View on unpkg · L143 Code excerpt · 9 lines 143 URL,
144 URLSearchParams,
145 encodeURIComponent,
⋯
194 },
195 async fetch (url, options) {
196 const opts = options || {};
⋯
277 assert.equal (writes[0 ].options.headers['X-Clauth-Write-Token' ], 'wt-fresh' );
278 assert.deepEqual (JSON.parse (writes[0 ].options.body), { action: 'restart' });
279 });
Critical Credential exfiltration
Source appears to send environment or credential material to an external endpoint.
cli/commands/serve.js View on unpkg · L6 Medium Install persistence
Source writes installer persistence such as shell profile or service configuration.
cli/commands/serve.js View on unpkg · L6 Low Weak crypto
Package source references weak cryptographic algorithms.
cli/commands/serve.js View on unpkg · L6 Shared code excerpt · 3 findings · 11 lines 7 import http from "http" ;
8 import crypto from "crypto" ;
⋯
35 import ora from "ora" ;
36
cli/http/components/system-component.js View file High Same file environment network execution
A single source file combines environment access, network access, and code or shell execution; review context before blocking.
cli/http/components/system-component.js View on unpkg · L179 Code excerpt · 9 lines 179 try {
180 const resp = await fetch (`http://127.0.0.1:${LIVE_PORT}/ping` );
181 if (resp.ok) { promoted = true ; break ; }
⋯
185 // Spawn a new daemon on the live port with same credentials
186 const { spawn } = await import ("child_process" );
187 const cliEntry = CLI_ENTRY_PATH;
⋯
193
High Credential redirect persistence
Manifest-reachable source sends a prompted API credential to a fixed unofficial gateway and persists the redirection.
cli/commands/install.js View on unpkg Scanner record · 8 lines Manifest-reachable source captures an API credential, sends it to a fixed unofficial gateway, and persists that redirection in agent or shell configuration.
cli/commands/install.jsimport { createInterface } from 'readline';
? join(process.env.USERPROFILE || '', '.claude', 'skills')
: join(process.env.HOME || '', '.claude', 'skills'));
// Prompt helpers — single shared readline to
headers: { 'Authorization': `Bearer ${pat}`, 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
headers: { 'Authorization': `Bearer ${pat}` },
method: 'GET', headers: { 'Authorization': 'Bearer test' }
if (!anon || !serviceRole) throw new Error('API keys not found in response');
High Known malware source similarity
Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.
cli/commands/install.js View on unpkg cli/http/components/system-component.js#virtual:normalized:round1 View file High Command output exfiltration
Source combines command execution, command-output handling, and outbound requests; review data flow before blocking.
cli/http/components/system-component.js#virtual:normalized:round1 View on unpkg · L24 Code excerpt · 6 lines 24 // Optional body { pull: true } runs "git pullnpm install" in the repo
25 // root FIRST, synchronously, before respawning — so the dashboard"s\n // Restart button can offer \"just restart\" vs \"pull latest + reinstall,\n // then restart\" without a se...
26 const bootKeyPath = ctx.getBootKeyPath();
⋯
38 // too: older scripts and curl default to GET). Also the cross-process call
39 // /make-live"s own promotion flow makes against the CURRENT live daemon.\n const shutdownHandler = async (req, res) => {\n operation(\"daemon.shutdown\", { port: ctx.port },...
40 // migration), `pm2 restart` is what actually gets this promotion onto
High Trigger reachable command output exfiltration
A manifest entrypoint or package-local install chain reaches command-output exfiltration behavior.
High Sandbox evasion gated capability
Source gates dangerous network, credential, or execution behavior behind CI, host, platform, time, or geo fingerprint checks.
scripts/bootstrap.cjs View on unpkg · L3 Code excerpt · 12 lines 3 'use strict' ;
4 const { execSync, spawnSync } = require ('child_process' );
5 const { join } = require ('path' );
6 const ROOT = join (__dirname, '..' );
7
⋯
17 if (!check ('git' )) {
18 console.error (' x git not found. Install from https://git-scm.com' );
Medium Ships native binary
Package ships native binary artifacts.
scripts/bin/bootstrap-win.exe View on unpkg Scanner record · 4 lines path = scripts/bin/bootstrap-win.exe
kind = native_binary
sizeBytes = 37675323
magicHex = [redacted]
Medium Ships build helper
Package ships non-JavaScript build or shell helper files.
install.sh View on unpkg Scanner record · 4 lines path = install.sh
kind = build_helper
sizeBytes = 1342
magicHex = [redacted]
cli/dashboard/dashboard.js#virtual:normalized:round1 View file High Semantic analysis limited
A bounded semantic-analysis stage reached its safety limit; remaining detectors completed, but this package requires AI review.
cli/dashboard/dashboard.js#virtual:normalized:round1 View on unpkg Scanner record · 1 line stage = ast_semantic_analysis; reason = ast_parse_error; limitedFiles = 6
High Known malware source similarity
Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.
cli/commands/agent-pool.js View on unpkg Scanner record · 6 lines matchType = normalized_sha256
matchedPackage = @lifeaitools/clauth@2.15.19
matchedPath = cli/commands/agent-pool.js
matchedIdentity = npm:QGxpZmVhaXRvb2xzL2NsYXV0aA:2.15.19
similarity = 1.000
summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source
High Known malware source similarity
Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.
cli/commands/doctor.js View on unpkg Scanner record · 6 lines matchType = normalized_sha256
matchedPackage = @lifeaitools/clauth@2.15.19
matchedPath = cli/commands/doctor.js
matchedIdentity = npm:QGxpZmVhaXRvb2xzL2NsYXV0aA:2.15.19
similarity = 1.000
summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source
cli/http/components/tunnel-component.js View file High Known malware source similarity
Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.
cli/http/components/tunnel-component.js View on unpkg Scanner record · 6 lines matchType = normalized_sha256
matchedPackage = @lifeaitools/clauth@2.15.19
matchedPath = cli/http/components/tunnel-component.js
matchedIdentity = npm:QGxpZmVhaXRvb2xzL2NsYXV0aA:2.15.19
similarity = 1.000
summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source
cli/mcp/providers/clauth-core-provider.js View file High Known malware source similarity
Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.
cli/mcp/providers/clauth-core-provider.js View on unpkg Scanner record · 6 lines matchType = normalized_sha256
matchedPackage = @lifeaitools/clauth@2.15.19
matchedPath = cli/mcp/providers/clauth-core-provider.js
matchedIdentity = npm:QGxpZmVhaXRvb2xzL2NsYXV0aA:2.15.19
similarity = 1.000
summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source
High Known malware source similarity
Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.
cli/studio-debug.js View on unpkg Scanner record · 6 lines matchType = normalized_sha256
matchedPackage = @lifeaitools/clauth@2.15.19
matchedPath = cli/studio-debug.js
matchedIdentity = npm:QGxpZmVhaXRvb2xzL2NsYXV0aA:2.15.19
similarity = 1.000
summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source
High Known malware source similarity
Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.
scripts/postinstall.js View on unpkg Scanner record · 6 lines matchType = normalized_sha256
matchedPackage = @lifeaitools/clauth@2.15.19
matchedPath = scripts/postinstall.js
matchedIdentity = npm:QGxpZmVhaXRvb2xzL2NsYXV0aA:2.15.19
similarity = 1.000
summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source
High Known malware source similarity
Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.
cli/commands/watchdog.js View on unpkg Scanner record · 6 lines matchType = normalized_sha256
matchedPackage = @lifeaitools/clauth@2.15.19
matchedPath = cli/commands/watchdog.js
matchedIdentity = npm:QGxpZmVhaXRvb2xzL2NsYXV0aA:2.15.19
similarity = 1.000
summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source
High Known malware source similarity
Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.
cli/webdav-service.js View on unpkg Scanner record · 6 lines matchType = normalized_sha256
matchedPackage = @lifeaitools/clauth@2.15.19
matchedPath = cli/webdav-service.js
matchedIdentity = npm:QGxpZmVhaXRvb2xzL2NsYXV0aA:2.15.19
similarity = 1.000
summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source
High Known malware source similarity
Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.
cli/commands/login.js View on unpkg Scanner record · 6 lines matchType = normalized_sha256
matchedPackage = @lifeaitools/clauth@2.15.19
matchedPath = cli/commands/login.js
matchedIdentity = npm:QGxpZmVhaXRvb2xzL2NsYXV0aA:2.15.19
similarity = 1.000
summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source
Code excerpt · 3 lines 309 patternName = generic_password
severity = medium
line = 309
Code excerpt · 3 lines 447 patternName = generic_password
severity = medium
line = 447
Code excerpt · 3 lines 448 patternName = generic_password
Critical Secret pattern
GitHub personal access token in cli/commands/scrub.test.js
cli/commands/scrub.test.js View on unpkg · L18 Code excerpt · 3 lines 18 patternName = github_pat
severity = critical
line = 18
Versions23 known versions Version Verdict Type Firewall Report Released
2.16.11 latest Suspicious Persistence Warn Published Sep 25, 2026 2.16.8 Malicious Persistence Block Published Sep 24, 2026 2.16.1 Suspicious AI-agent capability abuse Warn Published Sep 20, 2026 2.16.0 Suspicious Persistence Warn Published Sep 18, 2026 2.15.19 Malicious Install hook abuse Block Published Sep 14, 2026 2.15.18 Malicious Install hook abuse Block Published Sep 14, 2026 2.15.17 Malicious Install hook abuse Block Published Sep 12, 2026 2.15.16 Malicious Install hook abuse Block Published Sep 12, 2026 2.15.15 Malicious Install hook abuse Block Published Sep 11, 2026 2.15.14 Malicious Install hook abuse Block Published Sep 11, 2026 2.15.12 Malicious Install hook abuse Block Published Sep 11, 2026 2.15.11 Malicious Install hook abuse Block Published Sep 7, 2026 2.15.10 Malicious Persistence Block Published Sep 7, 2026 2.15.4 Malicious Install hook abuse Block Published Sep 5, 2026 2.15.3 Suspicious Install hook abuse Warn Published Sep 5, 2026 2.1.1 Policy finding Soft block: AI-agent control surface Block Published Aug 21, 2026 2.0.3 Policy finding Soft block: AI-agent control surface Block Published Aug 20, 2026 2.0.2 Policy finding Soft block: AI-agent control surface Block Published Aug 20, 2026 2.0.1 Policy finding Soft block: AI-agent control surface Block Published Aug 20, 2026 1.30.25 Policy finding Soft block: AI-agent control surface Block Published Aug 18, 2026 1.30.24 Policy finding Soft block: AI-agent control surface Block Published Aug 17, 2026 1.30.23 Policy finding Soft block: AI-agent control surface Block Published Aug 6, 2026 Show 12 more versions Show fewer versions 1 version is still under review and not listed.
Code↓
Package metadata 8 findings
Medium Network
Medium Environment variables
Medium Structural risk force deep review
import { execFileSync, execSync as execSyncTop, spawn } from "child_process" ;
37 import Conf from "conf" ;
106 const __dirname = path.dirname (fileURLToPath (import .meta.url));
107 const CLAUTH_ROOT_DIR = path.join (__dirname, "../.." );
108 const pkg = JSON.parse (fs.readFileSync (path.join (__dirname, "../../package.json" ), "utf8" ));
109 const VERSION = pkg.version;
119 // throws "fatal: not a git repository" here, caught below -- but execSync's
Critical Trigger reachable dangerous capability
A package entrypoint or install-time lifecycle script reaches a source file with blocking dangerous behavior.
cli/commands/serve.js View on unpkg · L6 High Trigger reachable credential exfiltration
A manifest entrypoint or package-local install chain reaches credential exfiltration behavior.
cli/commands/serve.js View on unpkg · L6 High Trigger reachable persistence
A manifest entrypoint or package-local install chain reaches persistence behavior.
cli/commands/serve.js View on unpkg · L6 Shared code excerpt · 3 findings · 12 lines Trigger-reachable chain: manifest.bin -> cli/index.js -> cli/commands/serve.js
6
7 import http from "http" ;
8 import crypto from "crypto" ;
⋯
35 import ora from "ora" ;
36 import { execFileSync, execSync as execSyncTop, spawn } from "child_process" ;
37 import Conf from "conf" ;
⋯
105
106 const __dirname = path.dirname (fileURLToPath (import .meta.url));
107 const CLAUTH_ROOT_DIR = path.join (__dirname, "../.." );
108 const pkg = JSON.parse (fs.readFileSync (path.join (__dirname, "../../package.json" ), "utf8" ));
109 const VERSION = pkg.version;
⋯
119 // throws "fatal: not a git repository" here, caught below -- but execSync's
const out = fs.openSync (LOG_FILE, "a" );
194 const childEnv = { ...process.env, __CLAUTH_DAEMON: "1" };
195 delete childEnv.__CLAUTH_STAGED; // Clear staged flag — child is live
High Known malware source similarity
Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.
cli/http/components/system-component.js View on unpkg Scanner record · 6 lines matchType = normalized_sha256
matchedPackage = @lifeaitools/clauth@2.15.19
matchedPath = cli/http/components/system-component.js
matchedIdentity = npm:QGxpZmVhaXRvb2xzL2NsYXV0aA:2.15.19
similarity = 1.000
summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source
Scanner record · 6 lines matchType = normalized_sha256
matchedPackage = @lifeaitools/clauth@2.15.19
matchedPath = cli/commands/install.js
matchedIdentity = npm:QGxpZmVhaXRvb2xzL2NsYXV0aA:2.15.19
similarity = 1.000
summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source
cli/http/components/system-component.js#virtual:normalized:round1
Code excerpt · 6 lines Trigger-reachable command-output exfiltration chain: manifest.bin -> cli/index.js -> cli/commands/serve.js -> cli/http/components/system-component.js
24 // Optional body { pull: true } runs "git pullnpm install" in the repo
25 // root FIRST, synchronously, before respawning — so the dashboard"s\n // Restart button can offer \"just restart\" vs \"pull latest + reinstall,\n // then restart\" without a se...
26 const bootKeyPath = ctx.getBootKeyPath();
⋯
38 // too: older scripts and curl default to GET). Also the cross-process call
39 // /make-live"s own promotion flow makes against the CURRENT live daemon.\n const shutdownHandler = async (req, res) => {\n operation(\"daemon.shutdown\", { port: ctx.port },...
40 // migration), `pm2 restart` is what actually gets this pro
51 var platform = process.platform;
73 // straight to that outcome instead of blocking on it.