@markjaquith/agency@3.9.4
Manage agentic work across repositories with durable workbases
AI Security Review
scanned 14d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe postinstall hook performs first-party agent extension setup in the user’s Pi directory, which warrants a warning under the agent integration policy. Source inspection found ownership safeguards and no concrete attack behavior.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- The postinstall hook automatically installs the package’s Pi extension; preuninstall invokes its removal.
- The installer copies the bundled extension to the user’s Pi extensions directory and records ownership; it skips existing files it cannot verify as owned.
- The wider workbase and OpenCode integration sync is exposed as an explicit CLI subcommand.
- The integration service targets project workbase configuration, including agent instructions and OpenCode files.
- The installer refuses to replace a symlink or a file whose contents do not match its ownership record, and uninstall removes only a matching owned file.
- The bundled extension reads workbase instructions and adds them to the agent prompt; inspected source showed no network endpoint.
Source & flagged code
10 flagged · loading sourcePackage defines install-time lifecycle scripts.
package.jsonView on unpkgInstall-time lifecycle script is not statically allowlisted and needs review.
package.jsonView on unpkgPackage source references dynamic require/import behavior.
src/utils/interactive-loader.tsView on unpkg · L3Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @markjaquith/agency@3.9.4.
See all versions of @markjaquith/agency for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @markjaquith/agency@3.9.4 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
Think this verdict is wrong? Dispute it on GitHub or read how reports are produced.