@modss/baileys@2.0.0
This package appears in our research on the malicious Baileys forks, with how it works, the full package list and what to do if you installed it.
OpenSSF/OSV Malicious Advisory
imported 7d ago · by OpenSSF/OSVOpenSSF/OSV advisory MAL-2026-15918 confirms this npm version as malicious.
Advisory
MAL-2026-15918
Source
OpenSSF Malicious Packages via OSV
Summary
Malicious code in @modss/baileys (npm)
Details
@modss/baileys is a renamed fork of the Baileys WhatsApp Web library published 2026-09-01 and 2026-09-02 under a scope created the same day. lib/Socket/newsletter.js sets NEWSLETTER_LIST_URL to https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Dayyy-19/Anu/main/Newsletter.json. On every connection.update with connection === 'open', autoFollowConfiguredNewsletters() fetches that list and issues an executeWMexQuery FOLLOW for each id on the user's own authenticated WhatsApp session, caching followed ids in session/followed-newsletters.json. An Indonesian comment in the file explains that the list lives on GitHub so channels can be added or removed without redeploying the code, i.e. the follow targets are publisher-controlled at runtime. All three published versions carry the identical handler. The package also aliases its libsignal dependency to @modss/libsignal, which pkgwarden read as a plain rename with no malicious content. No credential or session-key theft was observed, and the dead-drop URL was not requested by pkgwarden. All versions were fetched from the npm registry and read by hand on 2026-09-03. Same remote-dead-drop shape as MAL-2026-15819 (@mrlegendbot/baileys) and MAL-2026-13932 (my-auto-follow).
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## Source: amazon-inspector (0b6522f1f967259853346030f220d40ef098fc3d54116a23161fb4ccf97f9bd3) package.json declares a runtime dependency `libsignal` whose source is `github:RILLYZY/libsignal-node` — a GitHub reference with no commit SHA, tag, or version pin. On `npm install`, npm fetches whatever HEAD of that personal repository currently returns and runs any lifecycle scripts it contains on the installer's machine, with no integrity check. Whoever controls that GitHub account controls code that executes on any machine installing @modss/baileys, and the fetched content can change silently between installs. The named dependency also shadows the legitimate `libsignal` cryptographic library, meaning callers of the package's signal-protocol paths load code from the unpinned third-party fork rather than a registry-audited artifact.
## Source: ghsa-malware (f380df417118802ce37118bae231cadcd5f41d20c60ac6ad830d9f62a53c8601) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.
Source & flagged code
0 flagged · loading sourceNo flagged code excerpts are attached to this scan.
Findings
1 High
HighOsv Malicious Advisory
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @modss/baileys@2.0.0.
The same advisory and Firewall decision cover 3 recorded versions
1.0.0, 1.0.1, 2.0.0
See all versions of @modss/baileys for other recorded verdicts.
- Avoid installing @modss/baileys@2.0.0. Remove it from direct dependencies and check your lockfile for transitive copies.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
- If this version ran, investigate the affected machine and build environment. Rotate credentials it could access and rebuild from a trusted environment.
Evidence last updated: .
Source advisory published: .
This report uses published external intelligence. The advisory does not provide a separate source-code analysis for each listed version.
Think this verdict is wrong? Dispute it on GitHub or read how reports are produced.