@or-sdk/data-hub-svc

npm/@or-sdk/data-hub-svc is affected by the large-scale, self-propagating npm supply-chain worm of 2026-08-04 (the "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again" wave) — the same campaign that began with the compromise of the keyv and cacheable maintainer account. The listed version(s) were trojanized and republished by the worm after it reached an npm publish token belonging to a maintainer in this namespace; the payload enumerates every package a stolen token controls and republishes each with the same hook, so many packages under this scope were poisoned in the same short window. Every poisoned release adds a preinstall hook (`"preinstall": "node setup.mjs"`) that runs on a bare `npm install`, before any project code. setup.mjs downloads a standalone Bun runtime and runs a byte-identical, heavily obfuscated ~728 KB second-stage credential stealer (shipped as Math_Symbol.js / math_init.js). It harvests GitHub, npm, AWS, GCP, Azure, HashiCorp Vault and Kubernetes credentials plus generic secrets and private keys (TruffleHog-style sweep), reads CI/CD secrets and identifies build runners, then republishes further packages the stolen token can reach. Rather than a fixed command-and-control host, it exfiltrates stolen findings to attacker-created GitHub repositories (descriptions reading "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again") and over DNS. Treat any environment that installed an affected version (with install scripts enabled) as compromised: rotate and revoke all reachable credentials (npm and GitHub tokens, cloud keys, Vault/Kubernetes secrets, and CI org/repo secrets). Part of the August 2026 npm worm that poisoned 400+ packages across many organizations. --- ## Source: amazon-inspector (ca56df0139c6aa5185e818e877439efafd80bd13cf7a3cf2521c4269d733f5e3) package.json declares a preinstall hook `node setup.mjs`. setup.mjs uses hex-mangled `_0x...` identifiers to download a platform-specific Bun runtime zip from github.com/oven-sh/bun/releases (bun-v1.3.13), extracts it to an OS temporary directory, chmods the binary executable, and invokes it against a sibling file `math_init.js` via `execFileSync(bunPath, ['math_init.js'], { stdio: 'inherit' })`. math_init.js is a ~727KB single-line `// @bun @bun-cjs` bundle with hex-mangled identifiers, a large rotated string/number constant array, and a string-array shuffle routine (`WV8StW`) — the canonical obfuscator.io string-array pattern. The bundled payload is only reachable through the alternate Bun runtime dropped at install time, bypassing Node-based inspection. The package advertises itself as a data-hub SDK; that purpose does not require fetching a second language runtime or executing an opaque compiled blob. Installing this package on any platform automatically fetches an external binary and executes attacker-controlled obfuscated code on the installer host. ## Source: ghsa-malware (5b716d5b6153f595420e47ebf7bc938c2578476f8763b702496b827139c17ad5) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.