@or-sdk/deployer

npm/@or-sdk/deployer is affected by the large-scale, self-propagating npm supply-chain worm of 2026-08-04 (the "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again" wave) — the same campaign that began with the compromise of the keyv and cacheable maintainer account. The listed version(s) were trojanized and republished by the worm after it reached an npm publish token belonging to a maintainer in this namespace; the payload enumerates every package a stolen token controls and republishes each with the same hook, so many packages under this scope were poisoned in the same short window. Every poisoned release adds a preinstall hook (`"preinstall": "node setup.mjs"`) that runs on a bare `npm install`, before any project code. setup.mjs downloads a standalone Bun runtime and runs a byte-identical, heavily obfuscated ~728 KB second-stage credential stealer (shipped as Math_Symbol.js / math_init.js). It harvests GitHub, npm, AWS, GCP, Azure, HashiCorp Vault and Kubernetes credentials plus generic secrets and private keys (TruffleHog-style sweep), reads CI/CD secrets and identifies build runners, then republishes further packages the stolen token can reach. Rather than a fixed command-and-control host, it exfiltrates stolen findings to attacker-created GitHub repositories (descriptions reading "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again") and over DNS. Treat any environment that installed an affected version (with install scripts enabled) as compromised: rotate and revoke all reachable credentials (npm and GitHub tokens, cloud keys, Vault/Kubernetes secrets, and CI org/repo secrets). Part of the August 2026 npm worm that poisoned 400+ packages across many organizations. --- ## Source: amazon-inspector (6e5fc8ca54639e5e7d6d8fa95e56c930f54c00e98b7b9e77ac9fc3cdd60352fb) The package's `preinstall` script (setup.mjs) downloads the Bun runtime from the oven-sh/bun GitHub release (pinned to bun-v1.3.13), extracts and chmods it executable in a temp directory, and invokes it against a bundled sibling file `math_init.js` at install time. `math_init.js` is a 727 KB Bun-compiled bundle carrying obfuscator.io-style artifacts (string-array rotation via `MmgoCP.push(MmgoCP.shift())`, renamed identifiers, and a 1000+ entry opaque literal payload table) whose contents cannot be inspected. The package advertises itself as a small REST SDK (activate/deactivate flows, fetch logs) and its `src/` and `dist/` TypeScript output is ordinary and unobfuscated; only the install-time script uses obfuscator.io-renamed identifiers (`_0x488df8`, `_0x52943e`, `_0x24db8d`) for its `fs`/`https`/`os` handles, and the executed `math_init.js` name has no relation to the SDK's functionality. The `@or-sdk/*` scope and internal `gitlab.internal.onereach.io` references in the CHANGELOG are consistent with a hijacked or typosquatted republish of a legitimate internal SDK with an alternate-runtime dropper appended. Fetching an alternate language runtime specifically to execute a hidden sibling bundle bypasses Node-based install scanners; the Bun-runtime fetch is from an official project domain but the code it is used to execute is the package's own opaque, obfuscated blob unrelated to the advertised SDK. ## Source: ghsa-malware (bdb3ac27146c8277bd7031f58ae4e4b540866943278c0d10a3caa2d15a66840b) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.