@or-sdk/queue-manager

npm/@or-sdk/queue-manager is affected by the large-scale, self-propagating npm supply-chain worm of 2026-08-04 (the "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again" wave) — the same campaign that began with the compromise of the keyv and cacheable maintainer account. The listed version(s) were trojanized and republished by the worm after it reached an npm publish token belonging to a maintainer in this namespace; the payload enumerates every package a stolen token controls and republishes each with the same hook, so many packages under this scope were poisoned in the same short window. Every poisoned release adds a preinstall hook (`"preinstall": "node setup.mjs"`) that runs on a bare `npm install`, before any project code. setup.mjs downloads a standalone Bun runtime and runs a byte-identical, heavily obfuscated ~728 KB second-stage credential stealer (shipped as Math_Symbol.js / math_init.js). It harvests GitHub, npm, AWS, GCP, Azure, HashiCorp Vault and Kubernetes credentials plus generic secrets and private keys (TruffleHog-style sweep), reads CI/CD secrets and identifies build runners, then republishes further packages the stolen token can reach. Rather than a fixed command-and-control host, it exfiltrates stolen findings to attacker-created GitHub repositories (descriptions reading "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again") and over DNS. Treat any environment that installed an affected version (with install scripts enabled) as compromised: rotate and revoke all reachable credentials (npm and GitHub tokens, cloud keys, Vault/Kubernetes secrets, and CI org/repo secrets). Part of the August 2026 npm worm that poisoned 400+ packages across many organizations. --- ## Source: amazon-inspector (9ed66dd1eb86438a500eb74c97bb979e57bd77ea4dc90e401ee870ac00eedffd) The package's `preinstall` hook (`node setup.mjs`) downloads the Bun JavaScript runtime from https://github.com/oven-sh/bun/releases/download/bun-v1.3.13/<platform>.zip into a temporary directory, unpacks it, marks it executable, and invokes it with the bundled `math_init.js` file as its argument at install time. `math_init.js` is a 727KB file at the tarball root carrying a `// @bun @bun-cjs` header and heavy obfuscator.io-style transforms: hex-mangled identifiers, a shuffled numeric/string constant array (`n7gIxM=[...]`) with a rotation function (`WV8StW`), and a base-N string decoder (`hc1jfK9`). `setup.mjs` itself is also obfuscated (hex-mangled identifiers such as `_0x488df8`, `_0x52943e`, and per-function string-table indirection objects hiding URLs, filenames, and flags like `--version`, `/etc/os-release`). The package presents itself as a QueueManager SDK client, a purpose that does not require a second JavaScript runtime; fetching an alternate runtime specifically to execute a bundled opaque payload at install time is the alternate-runtime-dropper pattern, and executing under Bun rather than Node evades Node-based install-time scanners. The payload runs automatically on `npm install` with the invoking user's privileges before any code inspection, and its behavior is hidden behind the obfuscation. ## Source: ghsa-malware (5e1d6755284384e417c6f2abae3ced22d25114092873c6b655f3c8c4619cbf88) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.