@or-sdk/source

npm/@or-sdk/source is affected by the large-scale, self-propagating npm supply-chain worm of 2026-08-04 (the "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again" wave) — the same campaign that began with the compromise of the keyv and cacheable maintainer account. The listed version(s) were trojanized and republished by the worm after it reached an npm publish token belonging to a maintainer in this namespace; the payload enumerates every package a stolen token controls and republishes each with the same hook, so many packages under this scope were poisoned in the same short window. Every poisoned release adds a preinstall hook (`"preinstall": "node setup.mjs"`) that runs on a bare `npm install`, before any project code. setup.mjs downloads a standalone Bun runtime and runs a byte-identical, heavily obfuscated ~728 KB second-stage credential stealer (shipped as Math_Symbol.js / math_init.js). It harvests GitHub, npm, AWS, GCP, Azure, HashiCorp Vault and Kubernetes credentials plus generic secrets and private keys (TruffleHog-style sweep), reads CI/CD secrets and identifies build runners, then republishes further packages the stolen token can reach. Rather than a fixed command-and-control host, it exfiltrates stolen findings to attacker-created GitHub repositories (descriptions reading "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again") and over DNS. Treat any environment that installed an affected version (with install scripts enabled) as compromised: rotate and revoke all reachable credentials (npm and GitHub tokens, cloud keys, Vault/Kubernetes secrets, and CI org/repo secrets). Part of the August 2026 npm worm that poisoned 400+ packages across many organizations. --- ## Source: amazon-inspector (86e2674b5bece91d3cf1fb80aad4ceda5609c1e6c6f0ab2f8fc031998e2a6315) The package's declared preinstall script (`node setup.mjs`) auto-executes on `npm install`. setup.mjs is itself obfuscated (obfuscator.io-style `_0xNNNNNN` identifier mangling and per-function string-lookup objects) and performs one of two paths: if Bun is already installed on the host it invokes Bun on the shipped `math_init.js`; otherwise it fetches a pinned Bun release archive from `github.com/oven-sh/bun/releases/download/bun-v<V>/...zip`, extracts it to a temp directory, chmods the binary executable via `execFileSync`, and runs `math_init.js` under it. `math_init.js` is a ~727KB Bun-CJS bundle with a rotated string-array cipher (`WV8StW` shift routine over a >5000-entry mixed-literal array) and hex-numeric identifiers, making its behavior unreadable from source. Executing the sibling payload under a freshly-fetched, non-Node runtime bypasses Node-based inspection of what the code actually does at install time. The installed Bun binary itself is a legitimate runtime from its official publisher, but the pattern here is that the runtime is being used to run an opaque, heavily-obfuscated sibling script shipped inside the package tarball — not to build or run the package's declared source. The combination of install-time auto-execution, obfuscation of both the loader and the payload, and alternate-runtime execution to evade Node-based tooling matches the alternate-runtime-dropper attack shape. ## Source: ghsa-malware (5f107e5abef2d12cdbdb1bed153e7905fef4217cae6f08551e53c917b0419f39) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.