registry / AI-agent control-surface risk / @rapchic/roast
@rapchic/roast
Evidence-based code roast CLI — install roast skills for AI coding agents
This report shows the evidence for @rapchic/roast@0.1.2, the only known version.
AI Security Review
scanned 3mo ago · by lpm-firewall-aiSource inspection confirms an unconsented postinstall mutation of a foreign AI-agent control surface. The global-install and existing-Cursor guards reduce scope but do not make the mutation user-invoked.
Static reason
High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.
Trigger
npm install -g @rapchic/roast, unless ROAST_SKIP_POSTINSTALL=1 or ~/.cursor is absent.
Impact
Changes a foreign AI-agent control surface and can affect Cursor behavior without an explicit roast command.
Mechanism
unconsented lifecycle deployment of Cursor skills, commands, and rules
Policy narrative
On global installation, the postinstall hook detects ~/.cursor and immediately invokes the Cursor installer with automatic confirmation. That installer copies package-controlled skill, command, and rule files into Cursor's global control directories and writes project-local .cursor assets in the current directory. This is lifecycle-triggered agent control-surface mutation rather than an explicit user install command.
AI rationale
Source inspection confirms an unconsented postinstall mutation of a foreign AI-agent control surface. The global-install and existing-Cursor guards reduce scope but do not make the mutation user-invoked.
Evidence
package.jsonscripts/postinstall.jsinstaller/src/install.jsinstaller/src/clients/cursor.jsinstaller/src/project.js~/.cursor/skills/roast~/.cursor/commands/roast*.md~/.cursor/rules/roast.mdc.cursor/skills/roast.cursor/commands.cursor/rules/roast.mdc
Decision evidence
public snapshotAI identified this as a dangerous AI-agent capability at 92.0% confidence with low false-positive risk.
Evidence for policy risk
- package.json defines postinstall.
- scripts/postinstall.js auto-runs on global npm install when ~/.cursor exists.
- Postinstall calls install({tools:'cursor',yes:true}) without user confirmation.
- installer/src/install.js installs global Cursor assets and project .cursor assets by default.
- installer/src/clients/cursor.js copies skills, commands, and rules into ~/.cursor.
Evidence against
- No credential harvesting or exfiltration code found.
- Network use is limited to explicit status/update checks against npm.
- Agent-content files contain review instructions, not data theft or remote payload loading.
Behavioral surface
ChildProcessEnvironmentVarsFilesystemNetworkShell
HighEntropyStringsUrlStrings
Source & flagged code
3 flagged · loading sourcepackage.jsonView file
•scripts.postinstall = node scripts/postinstall.js
High
Install Time Lifecycle Scripts
Package defines install-time lifecycle scripts.
package.jsonView on unpkg•scripts.postinstall = node scripts/postinstall.js
Medium
Ambiguous Install Lifecycle Script
Install-time lifecycle script is not statically allowlisted and needs review.
package.jsonView on unpkginstaller/src/clients/claude.jsView file
1Install-time code directly mutates a foreign AI-agent control surface:
L11: return {
L12: skillsDir: join(home, '.claude', 'skills'),
L13: claudeMd: join(home, '.claude', 'CLAUDE.md'),
L14: };
...
L59:
L60: await mkdir(join(getHomedir(), '.claude'), { recursive: true });
L61: const existing = existsSync(claudeMd) ? await readFile(claudeMd, 'utf8') : '';
Write operation from installer/src/clients/claude.js:
L11: return {
L12: skillsDir: join(home, '.claude', 'skills'),
L13: claudeMd: join(home, '.claude', 'CLAUDE.md'),
L14: };
...
L59:
L60: await mkdir(join(getHomedir(), '.claude'), { recursive: true });
L61: const existing = existsSync(claudeMd) ? await readFile(claudeMd, 'utf8') : '';
Foreign user/project scope from scripts/postinstall.js:
L1: #!/usr/bin/env node
L2: /**
Findings
1 Critical1 High4 Medium5 Low
CriticalAi Agent Control Hijackinstaller/src/clients/claude.js
HighInstall Time Lifecycle Scriptspackage.json
MediumAmbiguous Install Lifecycle Scriptpackage.json
MediumNetwork
MediumEnvironment Vars
MediumStructural Risk Force Deep Review
LowNon Install Lifecycle Scripts
LowScripts Present
LowFilesystem
LowHigh Entropy Strings
LowUrl Strings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @rapchic/roast@0.1.2.
The versions list below shows the verdict for each recorded version.
- Avoid installing @rapchic/roast@0.1.2. Remove it from direct dependencies and check your lockfile for transitive copies.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
- If this version ran, investigate the affected machine and build environment. Rotate credentials it could access and rebuild from a trusted environment.
Evidence last updated: .
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