@riddance/env
Too much code slows you down, creates risks, increases maintainability burdens, confuses AI. So let's commit less of it.
This report shows the evidence for @riddance/env@0.10.2, the only known version.
AI Security Review
scanned 3mo ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThis is a concrete unconsented postinstall mutation of foreign, broad AI-agent control surfaces, matching the block boundary. The absence of network exfiltration does not mitigate the control-surface hijack.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- package.json postinstall runs bin/install.js automatically.
- bin/install.js calls setup() against INIT_CWD.
- lib/env.js invokes setupAgents() during setup.
- lib/agents.js writes CLAUDE.md, AGENTS.md, GEMINI.md, Copilot, Cursor, Continue, and Claude settings.
- Agent files incorporate README and dependency ai.instructions content.
- Claude settings grant shell commands in the target project.
- No network endpoint or credential-exfiltration code found in inspected paths.
- No remote payload loading, eval, or binary loading found in inspected paths.
Source & flagged code
6 flagged · loading sourcePackage defines install-time lifecycle scripts.
package.jsonView on unpkgInstall-time lifecycle script is not statically allowlisted and needs review.
package.jsonView on unpkgFindings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @riddance/env@0.10.2.
The versions list below shows the verdict for each recorded version.
- Avoid installing @riddance/env@0.10.2. Remove it from direct dependencies and check your lockfile for transitive copies.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
- If this version ran, investigate the affected machine and build environment. Rotate credentials it could access and rebuild from a trusted environment.
Evidence last updated: .
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