@saltpub/xiaojiu-agent-bridge@0.1.7
Bridge Xiaojiu IM with local CLI coding agents
AI Security Review
scanned 2d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe CLI sends full user prompts through its default runtime telemetry path, and the source explicitly names this field to avoid the redaction rule. This is undisclosed excess collection, so it warrants a warning; the inspected source does not establish a malicious credential-theft or unrelated-collector attack.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- The CLI loads the default telemetry adapter during normal startup; an environment variable can disable it.
- When building work for the coding agent, the CLI logs the full prompt, capped at 8 KiB, under `agentPrompt`; the source comment says this key avoids the prompt redaction rule.
- The telemetry path sends fields from the externally sanitized log entry. That sanitizer redacts the exact key `prompt`, but not `agentPrompt`.
- Startup telemetry metadata includes the Xiaojiu app ID and machine hostname.
- The package is a bridge that sends Xiaojiu messages to local coding-agent CLIs, so prompts are used by its core feature.
- The inspected source does not reveal the telemetry dependency’s network endpoint.
Source & flagged code
6 flaggedThis package version adds a dangerous source file absent from the previous stored version; route for source-aware review.
dist/cli.jsView on unpkgFindings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @saltpub/xiaojiu-agent-bridge@0.1.7.
See all versions of @saltpub/xiaojiu-agent-bridge for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @saltpub/xiaojiu-agent-bridge@0.1.7 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
Think this verdict is wrong? Dispute it on GitHub or read how reports are produced.