registry / Data exfiltration / @saltpub/xiaojiu-agent-bridge
@saltpub/xiaojiu-agent-bridge
Bridge Xiaojiu IM with local CLI coding agents
This report shows the evidence for @saltpub/xiaojiu-agent-bridge@0.1.6. 1 of 6 known versions is blocked or flagged. The newest version, 0.1.7, is flagged. See all versions.
AI Security Review
scanned 2d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe CLI deliberately bypasses its prompt redaction and sends up to 8,192 characters of agent prompt content through default-on telemetry. This is concealed collection of user-provided content, so the package should be blocked.
Static reason
One or more suspicious static signals were detected.; previous stored version diff introduced dangerous source
Trigger
Starting the bridge listener with telemetry enabled, which is the default.
Impact
Prompts may contain private messages, source code, or other user-provided content and are sent to the telemetry adapter without an evident disclosure in the README. The adapter’s destination is not inspectable here.
Mechanism
The CLI records up to 8,192 characters of the agent prompt in an `agentPrompt` field, explicitly chosen to avoid the sanitizer’s `prompt` redaction, then emits sanitized log fields through the telemetry adapter.
Attack narrative
When the bridge starts, it loads its telemetry adapter unless disabled. During message processing, it adds up to 8,192 characters of the agent prompt to telemetry under `agentPrompt`; a source comment says this field name avoids the sanitizer’s redaction of `prompt`. The resulting fields are emitted to the adapter. This deliberate bypass conceals the collection of user message or code content from the sanitizer; the adapter’s destination is not visible in the inspected source.
AI rationale
The CLI deliberately bypasses its prompt redaction and sends up to 8,192 characters of agent prompt content through default-on telemetry. This is concealed collection of user-provided content, so the package should be blocked.
Evidence
dist/cli.jspackage.json
Decision evidence
public snapshotAI called this Malicious at 97.0% confidence as Malware with low false-positive risk.
Evidence for block
- The CLI loads the package’s telemetry adapter by default; disabling it requires a specific environment variable.
- The bridge logs an agent prompt capped at 8,192 characters and deliberately names it `agentPrompt` to bypass the sanitizer that redacts `prompt`.
- Sanitized log fields are passed to the telemetry adapter’s `emit` method.
- The telemetry adapter receives the app ID and machine hostname when the bridge starts.
Evidence against
- The prompt is used by the bridge’s core feature: sending Xiaojiu messages to a local coding agent.
- Telemetry can be disabled with `XIAOJIU_BRIDGE_TELEMETRY_DISABLED`.
- The telemetry adapter’s network destination is not present in the inspected package source.
Behavioral surface
ChildProcessCryptoDynamicRequireEnvironmentVarsFilesystemNetwork
HighEntropyStringsUrlStrings
Source & flagged code
5 flaggeddist/cli.jsView file
•matchType = previous_version_dangerous_delta
matchedPackage = @saltpub/xiaojiu-agent-bridge@0.1.5
matchedIdentity = npm:[redacted]:0.1.5
similarity = 0.750
summary = stored previous version shares package body but lacks this dangerous source file
Critical
Previous Version Dangerous Delta
This package version adds a dangerous source file absent from the previous stored version; route for source-aware review.
dist/cli.jsView on unpkg24import crossSpawn from "cross-spawn";
L25: import { execFile } from "child_process";
L26: function spawnProcess(command, args = [], options = {}) {
High
3import { join } from "path";
L4: if (!process.env.XIAOJIU_BRIDGE_HOME && process.env.npm[redacted] === "cli") {
L5: const localHome = join(process.cwd(), ".xiaojiu");
L6: if (existsSync(join(localHome, "config.json"))) {
...
L17: import { fileURLToPath } from "url";
L18: var packageJsonPath = path.resolve(path.dirname(fileURLToPath(import.meta.url)), "..", "package.json");
L19: var manifest = JSON.parse(readFileSync(packageJsonPath, "utf8"));
L20: var packageName = manifest.name;
...
L24: import crossSpawn from "cross-spawn";
L25: import { execFile } from "child_process";
L26: function spawnProcess(command, args = [], options = {}) {
...
L87: let settled = false;
Findings
1 Critical2 High4 Medium6 Low
CriticalPrevious Version Dangerous Deltadist/cli.js
HighChild Processdist/cli.js
HighCommand Output Exfiltrationdist/cli.js
MediumDynamic Requiredist/cli.js
MediumNetwork
MediumEnvironment Vars
MediumStructural Risk Force Deep Review
LowNon Install Lifecycle Scripts
LowScripts Present
LowWeak Cryptodist/cli.js
LowFilesystem
LowHigh Entropy Strings
LowUrl Strings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @saltpub/xiaojiu-agent-bridge@0.1.6.
The versions list below shows the verdict for each recorded version.
- Avoid installing @saltpub/xiaojiu-agent-bridge@0.1.6. Remove it from direct dependencies and check your lockfile for transitive copies.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
- If this version ran, investigate the affected machine and build environment. Rotate credentials it could access and rebuild from a trusted environment.
Evidence last updated: .
Think this verdict is wrong? Dispute it on GitHub or read how reports are produced.