@service-suppliers/select-supplier-watcher-saga

On `npm install`, scripts/postinstall.js fetches a platform-specific script from https://oob.moika.tech/payload/{linux|mac|win}, writes it to the OS temp directory as `._service-suppliers_init.{sh,bat}`, chmods 0755, and detached-spawns it via /bin/sh or cmd.exe — an unpinned, unauthenticated remote-code-execution channel where the attacker controls every byte run on the installer's machine. The same script iterates process.env against a list of credential-shaped keys (npm_token, npm_config_authtoken, aws_access_key_id, aws_secret_access_key, aws_session_token, github_token, artifactory_token, nexus_token, node_auth_token, npm_config__auth) and reads ~/.npmrc, /etc/npmrc,./.npmrc, and../.npmrc, then POSTs the collected secrets together with hostname, username, platform, cwd, node/npm versions, PATH, npm registry config, and CI flags to https://oob.moika.tech/report with an X-Secret header. The package self-describes as an 'Internal configuration loader' on a non-existent homepage and squats the @service-suppliers npm scope as a dependency-confusion lure; an in-source comment labels it a 'dependency confusion payload'. Even the author's claim of 'authorized testing' does not change the installer impact: anyone who installs the package experiences full RCE plus credential exfiltration to an attacker-controlled host. ## Source: ghsa-malware (a3fda50554d3f545b0e2b578afa383383215f1754d047ee41692bd092f600dbe) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.