@solidactions/cli@2.0.0
SolidActions CLI - Deploy and manage workflow automation
AI Security Review
scanned 4mo ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe static malicious label is unsupported by source: no preinstall/install/postinstall behavior exists. However, explicit commands install mutable remote content into AI-agent control paths, warranting a warning.
Static reason
One or more suspicious static signals were detected.; previous stored version diff introduced dangerous source
Trigger
User runs `solidactions init` (default skills enabled) or `solidactions ai init`.
Impact
Remote upstream content can influence AI agents operating in the initialized project.
Mechanism
Fetch remote GitHub content and write project AI-agent instruction/skill files.
AI rationale
The static malicious label is unsupported by source: no preinstall/install/postinstall behavior exists. However, explicit commands install mutable remote content into AI-agent control paths, warranting a warning.
Evidence
package.jsondist/commands/init.jsdist/commands/ai-init.jsdist/utils/skills.jsdist/utils/github.jsdist/commands/skill-run.jsCLAUDE.mdAGENTS.md.claude/skills/solidactions-*.md.agents/skills/solidactions-*.md.solidactions/sdk-reference.md
Network endpoints2
raw.githubusercontent.comapi.github.com
Decision evidence
public snapshotAI called this Suspicious at 91.0% confidence as Dangerous Capability with low false-positive risk.
Evidence for warning
- `ai init` fetches remote AI helper/skill content and writes it into project agent paths.
- Default `init` invokes `aiInit` unless `--no-skills` is supplied.
- Remote skill files are fetched from the mutable GitHub `main` branch.
- `skill exec --target host` downloads stored skill bundles then executes a user-supplied command.
Evidence against
- `package.json` has only `prepublishOnly`; no install-time lifecycle hook.
- Agent-file writes occur only through explicit `init`/`ai init` commands.
- No source evidence of hidden credential exfiltration or foreign agent-surface mutation.
- Child-process execution is an explicit local skill/dev command feature.
Behavioral surface
ChildProcessCryptoDynamicRequireEnvironmentVarsFilesystemNetwork
HighEntropyStringsUrlStrings
Source & flagged code
4 flaggeddist/commands/skill-run.jsView file
24const path_1 = __importDefault(require("path"));
L25: const child_process_1 = require("child_process");
L26: const axios_1 = __importDefault(require("axios"));
High
Child Process
Package source references child process execution.
dist/commands/skill-run.jsView on unpkg · L24dist/index.jsView file
39Object.defineProperty(exports, "__esModule", { value: true });
L40: const chalk_1 = __importDefault(require("chalk"));
L41: const commander_1 = require("commander");
Medium
Dynamic Require
Package source references dynamic require/import behavior.
dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L39dist/commands/dev.jsView file
Findings
1 Critical2 High4 Medium5 Low
CriticalPrevious Version Dangerous Deltadist/commands/dev.js
HighChild Processdist/commands/skill-run.js
HighRuntime Package Installdist/commands/dev.js
MediumDynamic Requiredist/index.js
MediumNetwork
MediumEnvironment Vars
MediumStructural Risk Force Deep Review
LowNon Install Lifecycle Scripts
LowScripts Present
LowFilesystem
LowHigh Entropy Strings
LowUrl Strings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @solidactions/cli@2.0.0.
See all versions of @solidactions/cli for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @solidactions/cli@2.0.0 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
Think this verdict is wrong? Dispute it on GitHub or read how reports are produced.