@solidactions/cli: Suspicious npm security report (Warn)

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Source & flagged code

4 flagged

dist/commands/skill-run.jsView file

Lines 4-44javascript

4};

5Object.defineProperty(exports, "__esModule", { value: true });

6exports.shellQuoteArg = shellQuoteArg;

7exports.parseEnvFile = parseEnvFile;

8exports.assembleEnv = assembleEnv;

9exports.execLocally = execLocally;

10exports.skillRunWithConfig = skillRunWithConfig;

11exports.skillRun = skillRun;

12/**

13 * solidactions skill dev <dir> [--crew <c>] [--environment <env>] [--env-file <f>] -- <command...>

14 *

15 * Local analogue of the crews MCP exec_skill: runs <command> with cwd=<dir>

16 * (matching the sandbox's cwd=/work/skills/<slug>), with crew variables

17 * fetched at runtime from /api/v1/crews/{id}/variables/resolve. Secrets are

18 * included only when the API key holds env:reveal; skipped names are printed.

19 * DELIBERATE DIVERGENCE from remote exec_skill: default environment is `dev`

20 * (this is a dev tool); remote defaults to production. Always prints the env.

21 */

22const fs_1 = __importDefault(require("fs"));

23const os_1 = __importDefault(require("os"));

24const path_1 = __importDefault(require("path"));

25const child_process_1 = require("child_process");

26const axios_1 = __importDefault(require("axios"));

High

Child Process

Package source references child process execution.

dist/commands/skill-run.jsView on unpkg · L24

27const chalk_1 = __importDefault(require("chalk"));

28const js_yaml_1 = __importDefault(require("js-yaml"));

29const api_1 = require("../utils/api");

30const crew_1 = require("../utils/crew");

31const RESERVED_KEYS = ['WORKFLOW_INPUT', 'WORKFLOW_INPUT_URL', 'STEPS_TRIGGER_ID', 'TENANT_ID', 'SA_PROXY_URL', 'SA_PROXY_TOKEN', 'WORKFLOW_SLUG', 'PATH', 'HOME'];

32const RESERVED_PREFIXES = ['SOLIDACTIONS_'];

33function isReservedEnvName(name) {

34 return RESERVED_KEYS.includes(name) || RESERVED_PREFIXES.some((p) => name.toUpperCase().startsWith(p));

35}

36/**

37 * Single-quote a commander-parsed argument for re-injection into a shell

38 * command line. commander's `<command...>` variadic already split the

39 * user's invocation into discrete argv words (the outer shell did any

40 * quote-stripping); joining those words back together with bare spaces and

41 * handing them to `sh -c` would let the inner shell reinterpret any

42 * metacharacters they contain (spaces, quotes, parens, `&&`, ...). Quoting

43 * each word individually keeps it intact as a single shell token, while

44 * still letting `shell: true` run multi-word commands.

dist/index.jsView file

Lines 19-59javascript

19var __importStar = (this && this.__importStar) || (function () {

20 var ownKeys = function(o) {

21 ownKeys

dist/commands/dev.jsView file

Lines 141-181javascript

141 const resultPath = path_1.default.join(os_1.default.tmpdir(), `sa-dev-result-${runUuid}-${(0, crypto_1.randomUUID)()}.json`);

142 // Write placeholder so the shim can overwrite it.

Source & flagged code

4 flagged · loading source

dist/commands/skill-run.jsView file

24const path_1 = __importDefault(require("path")); L25: const child_process_1 = require("child_process"); L26: const axios_1 = __importDefault(require("axios"));

High

Child Process

Package source references child process execution.

dist/commands/skill-run.jsView on unpkg · L24

dist/index.jsView file

39Object.defineProperty(exports, "__esModule", { value: true }); L40: const chalk_1 = __importDefault(require("chalk")); L41: const commander_1 = require("commander");

Medium

Dynamic Require

Package source references dynamic require/import behavior.

dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L39

dist/commands/dev.jsView file

•matchType = previous_version_dangerous_delta matchedPackage = @solidactions/cli@1.23.1 matchedIdentity = npm:QHNvbGlkYWN0aW9ucy9jbGk:1.23.1 similarity = 0.367 summary = stored previous version shares package body but lacks this dangerous source file

@solidactions/cli: Suspicious npm security report (Warn) | LPM Firewall

Source & flagged code

4 flagged

dist/commands/skill-run.jsView file

Lines 4-44javascript

4};

5Object.defineProperty(exports, "__esModule", { value: true });

6exports.shellQuoteArg = shellQuoteArg;

7exports.parseEnvFile = parseEnvFile;

8exports.assembleEnv = assembleEnv;

9exports.execLocally = execLocally;

10exports.skillRunWithConfig = skillRunWithConfig;

11exports.skillRun = skillRun;

12/**

13 * solidactions skill dev <dir> [--crew <c>] [--environment <env>] [--env-file <f>] -- <command...>

14 *

15 * Local analogue of the crews MCP exec_skill: runs <command> with cwd=<dir>

16 * (matching the sandbox's cwd=/work/skills/<slug>), with crew variables

17 * fetched at runtime from /api/v1/crews/{id}/variables/resolve. Secrets are

18 * included only when the API key holds env:reveal; skipped names are printed.

19 * DELIBERATE DIVERGENCE from remote exec_skill: default environment is `dev`

20 * (this is a dev tool); remote defaults to production. Always prints the env.

21 */

22const fs_1 = __importDefault(require("fs"));

23const os_1 = __importDefault(require("os"));

24const path_1 = __importDefault(require("path"));

25const child_process_1 = require("child_process");

26const axios_1 = __importDefault(require("axios"));

High

Child Process

Package source references child process execution.

dist/commands/skill-run.jsView on unpkg · L24

27const chalk_1 = __importDefault(require("chalk"));

28const js_yaml_1 = __importDefault(require("js-yaml"));

29const api_1 = require("../utils/api");

30const crew_1 = require("../utils/crew");

31const RESERVED_KEYS = ['WORKFLOW_INPUT', 'WORKFLOW_INPUT_URL', 'STEPS_TRIGGER_ID', 'TENANT_ID', 'SA_PROXY_URL', 'SA_PROXY_TOKEN', 'WORKFLOW_SLUG', 'PATH', 'HOME'];

32const RESERVED_PREFIXES = ['SOLIDACTIONS_'];

33function isReservedEnvName(name) {

34 return RESERVED_KEYS.includes(name) || RESERVED_PREFIXES.some((p) => name.toUpperCase().startsWith(p));

35}

36/**

37 * Single-quote a commander-parsed argument for re-injection into a shell

38 * command line. commander's `<command...>` variadic already split the

39 * user's invocation into discrete argv words (the outer shell did any

40 * quote-stripping); joining those words back together with bare spaces and

41 * handing them to `sh -c` would let the inner shell reinterpret any

42 * metacharacters they contain (spaces, quotes, parens, `&&`, ...). Quoting

43 * each word individually keeps it intact as a single shell token, while

44 * still letting `shell: true` run multi-word commands.

dist/index.jsView file

Lines 19-59javascript

19var __importStar = (this && this.__importStar) || (function () {

20 var ownKeys = function(o) {

21 ownKeys

dist/commands/dev.jsView file

Lines 141-181javascript

141 const resultPath = path_1.default.join(os_1.default.tmpdir(), `sa-dev-result-${runUuid}-${(0, crypto_1.randomUUID)()}.json`);

142 // Write placeholder so the shim can overwrite it.

@solidactions/cli@1.33.0

AI Security Review

Decision evidence

Source & flagged code

Source & flagged code

Findings

Behavioral surface

Source & flagged code