registry / @solidactions/cli / 2.0.2
@solidactions/cli@2.0.2
SolidActions CLI - Deploy and manage workflow automation
AI Security Review
scanned 4mo ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe package is not malicious by the inspected source: it has no install hook or unsolicited exfiltration. Its explicit AI-agent extension setup warrants a warning under the firewall policy because remote content is written into an agent control surface.
Static reason
One or more suspicious static signals were detected.; previous stored version diff introduced dangerous source
Trigger
User runs solidactions ai init or skill exec.
Impact
Installed remote instructions can influence an AI agent in the selected project; execution is user-command initiated.
Mechanism
Explicit remote skill installation and user-invoked local skill execution.
AI rationale
The package is not malicious by the inspected source: it has no install hook or unsolicited exfiltration. Its explicit AI-agent extension setup warrants a warning under the firewall policy because remote content is written into an agent control surface.
Evidence
package.jsondist/commands/ai-init.jsdist/utils/skills.jsdist/utils/github.jsdist/utils/examples-ref.jsdist/commands/skill-exec.js.solidactions/sdk-reference.md.claude/skills/solidactions-*.md.agents/skills/solidactions-*.mdCLAUDE.mdAGENTS.md~/.solidactions/skills/*
Network endpoints1
raw.githubusercontent.com
Decision evidence
public snapshotAI called this Suspicious at 91.0% confidence as Dangerous Capability with low false-positive risk.
Evidence for warning
- dist/commands/ai-init.js fetches remote helper content and writes it into AI-agent files.
- dist/utils/skills.js writes fetched skills to .claude/skills or .agents/skills.
- dist/utils/markers.js inserts or replaces a SolidActions block in CLAUDE.md or AGENTS.md.
- dist/commands/skill-exec.js can fetch a stored skill into a local cache and execute a user-supplied command.
Evidence against
- package.json has only prepublishOnly; no install-time lifecycle hook.
- AI-agent file mutation is reachable only through explicit solidactions ai init.
- Remote examples are pinned to a commit SHA in dist/utils/examples-ref.js.
- No source evidence of credential exfiltration, stealth persistence, destructive broad writes, or unsolicited execution.
Behavioral surface
ChildProcessCryptoDynamicRequireEnvironmentVarsFilesystemNetwork
HighEntropyStringsUrlStrings
Source & flagged code
4 flaggeddist/commands/skill-run.jsView file
24const path_1 = __importDefault(require("path"));
L25: const child_process_1 = require("child_process");
L26: const axios_1 = __importDefault(require("axios"));
High
Child Process
Package source references child process execution.
dist/commands/skill-run.jsView on unpkg · L24dist/index.jsView file
39Object.defineProperty(exports, "__esModule", { value: true });
L40: const chalk_1 = __importDefault(require("chalk"));
L41: const commander_1 = require("commander");
Medium
Dynamic Require
Package source references dynamic require/import behavior.
dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L39dist/commands/dev.jsView file
Findings
1 Critical2 High4 Medium5 Low
CriticalPrevious Version Dangerous Deltadist/commands/dev.js
HighChild Processdist/commands/skill-run.js
HighRuntime Package Installdist/commands/dev.js
MediumDynamic Requiredist/index.js
MediumNetwork
MediumEnvironment Vars
MediumStructural Risk Force Deep Review
LowNon Install Lifecycle Scripts
LowScripts Present
LowFilesystem
LowHigh Entropy Strings
LowUrl Strings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @solidactions/cli@2.0.2.
See all versions of @solidactions/cli for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @solidactions/cli@2.0.2 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
Think this verdict is wrong? Dispute it on GitHub or read how reports are produced.