registry / @solidactions/cli / 3.2.0
@solidactions/cli@3.2.0
SolidActions CLI - Deploy and manage workflow automation
AI Security Review
scanned 3mo ago · by lpm-firewall-aiSource establishes explicit, package-aligned AI-agent extension setup and host skill execution, not malware. This meets the warn boundary for first-party agent-extension lifecycle risk.
Static reason
One or more suspicious static signals were detected.; previous stored version diff introduced dangerous source
Trigger
User runs solidactions ai init/init, or skill exec --target host with a command.
Impact
Remote content may modify project agent instructions or run with the invoking user's permissions after explicit command use.
Mechanism
Remote agent-extension installation and explicit host execution of cached server skill content.
AI rationale
Source establishes explicit, package-aligned AI-agent extension setup and host skill execution, not malware. This meets the warn boundary for first-party agent-extension lifecycle risk.
Evidence
package.jsondist/commands/ai-init.jsdist/utils/skills.jsdist/utils/github.jsdist/commands/skill-exec.jsdist/commands/skill-run.jsCLAUDE.mdAGENTS.md.claude/skills/.agents/skills/.solidactions/sdk-reference.md~/.solidactions/cache/skills/
Network endpoints3
raw.githubusercontent.comapi.github.comapp.solidactions.com
Decision evidence
public snapshotAI called this Suspicious at 90.0% confidence as Dangerous Capability with low false-positive risk.
Evidence for warning
- dist/commands/ai-init.js fetches remote AI helper/skill content and writes it into the project.
- dist/utils/skills.js targets .claude/skills or .agents/skills and overwrites SolidActions skill files.
- dist/commands/skill-exec.js downloads server-stored skill bundles and can execute them on the host.
- dist/commands/skill-run.js spawns the user-supplied command with resolved platform variables.
Evidence against
- package.json has only prepublishOnly; no install-time lifecycle hook.
- AI-helper mutation is reachable only via explicit ai init or init command paths.
- skill exec requires a skill name, command, and explicit --target.
- GitHub downloads and API calls are package-aligned; no hidden exfiltration path found.
Behavioral surface
ChildProcessCryptoDynamicRequireEnvironmentVarsFilesystemNetwork
HighEntropyStringsUrlStrings
Source & flagged code
4 flaggeddist/utils/source-provenance.jsView file
16const path_1 = __importDefault(require("path"));
L17: const child_process_1 = require("child_process");
L18: const form_data_1 = __importDefault(require("form-data"));
High
Child Process
Package source references child process execution.
dist/utils/source-provenance.jsView on unpkg · L16dist/index.jsView file
39Object.defineProperty(exports, "__esModule", { value: true });
L40: const chalk_1 = __importDefault(require("chalk"));
L41: const commander_1 = require("commander");
Medium
Dynamic Require
Package source references dynamic require/import behavior.
dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L39dist/commands/dev.jsView file
Findings
1 Critical2 High4 Medium5 Low
CriticalPrevious Version Dangerous Deltadist/commands/login.js
HighChild Processdist/utils/source-provenance.js
HighRuntime Package Installdist/commands/dev.js
MediumDynamic Requiredist/index.js
MediumNetwork
MediumEnvironment Vars
MediumStructural Risk Force Deep Review
LowNon Install Lifecycle Scripts
LowScripts Present
LowFilesystem
LowHigh Entropy Strings
LowUrl Strings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @solidactions/cli@3.2.0.
See all versions of @solidactions/cli for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @solidactions/cli@3.2.0 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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