@su-record/vibe@4.2.19
Your personal FDE in Claude and Codex. Understand the work, use the right tools, deliver and retain useful context. One entry: vibe.
AI Security Review
scanned 6d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe postinstall hook automatically sets up first-party agent integrations during global npm installs, creating a concrete but bounded extension lifecycle risk. The global-only trigger and skip setting reduce the scope; the inspected behavior supports a warning rather than a block.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- The manifest runs scripts/postinstall.js after installation.
- The postinstall hook calls setupGlobal only for global npm installs unless VIBE_SKIP_SETUP is set.
- setupGlobal installs surfaces for detected clients, and the installer can write user-level agent files or register a plugin.
- The plugin setup code writes marketplace configuration; the register helper reads Claude’s installed plugin configuration.
- This is first-party integration setup; the hook is limited to global installs and has a skip setting.
- The inspected excerpts show no credential transfer, unrelated network recipient, or destructive behavior.
Source & flagged code
18 flagged · loading sourcePackage defines install-time lifecycle scripts.
package.jsonView on unpkgInstall-time lifecycle script is not statically allowlisted and needs review.
package.jsonView on unpkgPackage source references child process execution.
mcpb/server/index.jsView on unpkg · L10Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @su-record/vibe@4.2.19.
See all versions of @su-record/vibe for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @su-record/vibe@4.2.19 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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