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@su-record/vibe: AI-agent control-surface risk | LPM Firewall

registry / @su-record/vibe / 4.1.9

@su-record/vibe@4.1.9

An AX/FDE harness for Claude Code, Codex CLI and ChatGPT desktop. Say what you need, approve the scenarios once; the harness proves the work by running the checks itself. Memory in plain files, human tokens for irreversible actions, a ledger instead of cl

AI Security Review

scanned 1d ago · by lpm-firewall-ai

LPM flags this version as an AI-agent control-surface risk. A global npm install silently modifies Claude, Codex, and Hermes agent homes. It injects instruction cards and skills and registers command hooks.

Static reason

High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.; source matched previously finalized malicious package; routed for review

Trigger

Installing the package globally through npm without VIBE_SKIP_SETUP.

Impact

The package gains persistent influence over AI-agent instructions and tool-event execution across existing client homes.

Mechanism

Postinstall calls global setup to write agent control files and command hooks.

Policy narrative

On global npm installation, the postinstall script invokes setup without an explicit agent-configuration command. Setup detects AI client homes and writes persistent instruction cards and skills, then adds command hooks for Bash and edit events. This mutates broad, pre-existing AI-agent control surfaces and causes package code to run during later agent activity.

Rationale

This is an automatic install-time mutation of foreign AI-agent control surfaces, including persistent instructions and command hooks. The global-only guard does not provide consent for those changes.

Evidence

package.jsonscripts/postinstall.jsdist/install/global.jsdist/install/hooks.js~/.claude/CLAUDE.md~/.claude/skills~/.claude/settings.json~/.codex/AGENTS.md~/.codex/skills~/.codex/hooks.json~/.hermes/SOUL.md

Source & flagged code

14 flagged · loading source

package.jsonView file

•scripts.postinstall = node scripts/postinstall.js

High

Install Time Lifecycle Scripts

Package defines install-time lifecycle scripts.

package.jsonView on unpkg

•scripts.postinstall = node scripts/postinstall.js

Medium

Ambiguous Install Lifecycle Script

Install-time lifecycle script is not statically allowlisted and needs review.

package.jsonView on unpkg

mcpb/server/index.jsView file

10*/ L11: import { spawnSync } from 'node:child_process'; L12: import fs from 'node:fs';

High

Child Process

Package source references child process execution.

mcpb/server/index.jsView on unpkg · L10

dist/core/checks/review.jsView file

38delete env['CLAUDECODE']; // a nested client CLI must not think it is inside itself L39: const child = spawn(cmd, { cwd, shell: true, env, stdio: ['pipe', 'pipe', 'pipe'] }); L40: let reply = '';

High

Shell

Package source references shell execution.

dist/core/checks/review.jsView on unpkg · L38

dist/core/tree.jsView file

1import { createHash } from 'node:crypto'; L2: import { spawnSync } from 'node:child_process'; L3: import fs from 'node:fs'; ... L7: const result = spawnSync('git', args, { cwd: root, encoding: 'utf-8' }); L8: return result.status === 0 ? result.stdout : null; L9: }

Low

Weak Crypto

Package source references weak cryptographic algorithms.

dist/core/tree.jsView on unpkg · L1

dist/core/github.jsView file

1import { spawnSync } from 'node:child_process'; L2: import { readJson } from './store.js'; L3: import { usage } from './errors.js'; L4: const API = 'https://api.github.com'; L5: export function githubToken() { L6: const env = process.env['GITHUB_TOKEN'] ?? process.env['GH_TOKEN']; L7: if (env)

High

Same File Env Network Execution

A single source file combines environment access, network access, and code or shell execution; review context before blocking.

dist/core/github.jsView on unpkg · L1

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @su-record/vibe@4.1.5 matchedPath = dist/core/github.js matchedIdentity = npm:QHN1LXJlY29yZC92aWJl:4.1.5 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

dist/core/github.jsView on unpkg

dist/install/global.jsView file

16export const LEGACY_SKILL_NAMES = ['vibe.discover', 'vibe.scope', 'vibe.build', 'vibe.prove', 'vibe.handoff']; L17: const CLIENT_DIR = { claude: '.claude', codex: '.codex', hermes: '.hermes' }; L18: /** User-level layout: one per client home. Codex reads a native `~/.codex/hooks.json` shaped like Claude's settings. */ L19: export function globalLayout(client) { ... L21: if (client === 'claude') L22: return { card: path.join(dir, 'CLAUDE.md'), skills: path.join(dir, 'skills'), hook: path.join(dir, 'settings.json') }; L23: if (client === 'codex') L24: return { card: path.join(dir, 'AGENTS.md'), skills: path.join(dir, 'skills'), hook: path.join(dir, 'hooks.json') }; L25: // Hermes Agent: identity file SOUL.md is the only home-level instruction it always loads; skills follow the agentskil

Critical

Ai Agent Control Hijack

Source creates an unconsented AI-agent control surface through install-time mutation or a default unauthenticated remote skill channel.

dist/install/global.jsView on unpkg · L16

dist/install/plugin.jsView file

•Manifest-trigger-reachable source links an external AI-agent control path to a behavior-bearing write operation. export function sweeplegacypluginstore(home = os.homedir()) { const legacy = path.join(home, '.vibe', 'plugin'); if (!fs.existssync(legacy)) return []; fs.rmsync(legacy, { recursive: true, force: true }); const removed = [legacy]; const dotvibe = path.join(home, '.vibe'); if (fs.readdirsync(dotvibe).length === 0) { fs.rmsync(dotvibe, { recursive: true, force: true }); removed.push(dotvibe); } return removed; } export function languagepacks() { const dir = path.join(packageroot(), 'skills'); return fs.existssync

High

Trigger Reachable External Ai Agent Control Surface Mutation

Manifest-trigger-reachable source writes behavior-bearing configuration into a user or project AI-agent control surface.

dist/install/plugin.jsView on unpkg

dist/core/docs/pdf.js#virtual:normalized:round1View file

•stage = ast_semantic_analysis; reason = ast_parse_error; limitedFiles = 2

High

Semantic Analysis Limited

A bounded semantic-analysis stage reached its safety limit; remaining detectors completed, but this package requires AI review.

dist/core/docs/pdf.js#virtual:normalized:round1View on unpkg

dist/core/checks/eval.jsView file

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @su-record/vibe@4.1.5 matchedPath = dist/core/checks/eval.js matchedIdentity = npm:QHN1LXJlY29yZC92aWJl:4.1.5 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

dist/core/checks/eval.jsView on unpkg

dist/core/skills.jsView file

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @su-record/vibe@4.1.5 matchedPath = dist/core/skills.js matchedIdentity = npm:QHN1LXJlY29yZC92aWJl:4.1.5 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

dist/core/skills.jsView on unpkg

dist/cli/common.jsView file

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @su-record/vibe@4.1.7 matchedPath = dist/cli/common.js matchedIdentity = npm:QHN1LXJlY29yZC92aWJl:4.1.7 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

dist/cli/common.jsView on unpkg

dist/core/check.jsView file

•matchType = token_shingles matchedPackage = @su-record/vibe@4.1.7 matchedPath = dist/core/check.js matchedIdentity = npm:QHN1LXJlY29yZC92aWJl:4.1.7 similarity = 1.000 shingleOverlap = 48 summary = source token shingles overlapped finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

dist/core/check.jsView on unpkg